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Chapter I
INTROD UC’ITON
Most scientists believe and most governments seem to accept that global
warming poses a threat to the world environment. Although tbere are residual
uncertainlies in tile scientific community as to the nature and gravity of tile
global warming threat (Broecker, 1995), the solution to this problem can not be
found in changes ill behaviour of individual countries or even individual trading
blocks acting on their own. Instead, any programme of action to fend off the
threat to tile world environment ,,viii ultimately depend on an agreement or
agreements at a world level, v,,hicb involve all tile major economies, developed
and underdeveloped. This makes the process of designing an effective strategy
exceptionally difficult. (see Box A for a discussion of global ‘.‘.,arming).
With the objective of reaching an initial agreement, a major international
conference will be held in Kyoto in December 1997 under the auspices of the
United Nations. This will be the second such UN conference to be beld in tile
1990s and it seems likely that the evolving policy debate will continue for many
years afterwards, paralleling the continuing development of understanding of the
problem in the scientific community. The role of the conference is to agree
among tile major players in tile world economy a first policy response to tile
problem which will lead eventtmlly to an agreed comprehensive plan for action
at a world level.
The EU, as part of its negotiating position for tile conference, has agreed a
policy that would require a cut of 15 per cent in EU-wide emissions of
greenhouse gases between 1990 and 2010. This proposed restriction on
emissions is at tile more ambitious end of tile range of proposals being pot
tbrward by the major economies of tile developed world. Ho’,vever, it must be
seen as but one of many different inputs into what ‘.‘.,ill be an exceptionally
difficult set of negotiations. Any agreement reached in Kyoto will involve not
only the restriction of emissions of greenhouse gases but it will also have
important implications for tile distribution of income between the developed and
the underdeveloped world and among individual trading blocks or countries
within the developed world itself.
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Box A: What is the Problem of Global Warming?
Over the last 150 years tile world has seen a huge incrcase in population and a related
massive rise in the use of fossil fuels - coal, oil and gas. The burning of the fossil fuels
resuhs in the carbon, which is fixed in the coal or oil, combining with oxygen in the
atmosphere to form carbon dioxide (CO2). Scientific evidence suggests that the increase in
the concentration oFcarbon dioxide in the air is resulting in a perceptible increase in the
global temperature - a change which could have a lasting impact on our climate, our
physical environment, and our whole way of life.
The cause of this warming revolves around the "Greenhouse Effect". All bodies in space
emit radiation, including the earth and its atmosphere. The earth receives short-wave heat
rays from the sun which heat up its surface. The earth then re-emits long-wave heat rays
retransmitting some of the sun’s heal. Certain gases naturally present in the earth’s
amlosphere allow short-wave heat to pass through, but trap a considerable amount of the
long wave radiation from the earth. The effect is similar to that of a greenhouse in that itI
allow, s incoming Ileal but traps outgoing heat. The impact of these gases is to make the
earth s surface warmer than il° would b in their absence. The e rth s su face currently has I
an average temperature of 15 C; without the "Greenhouse Effect" it would be -18 C.
Tile concentration of the so-called "Greenhouse Gases" (GHGs) in the atmosphere has
increased rapidly in recent decades. "[’he predicted consequence of this increase in human
production oFGHGs is an increase in global temperatures causing rising sea levels as the
polar ice-caps melt. Changes in tile sea levels will alter the climate in various regions of
the globe. However, Ihere remains considerable uncertainly about the magnitude of the
aroblem, the likely change in tile world’s climate, and ultimately the effect on our
~nvironmcnt and our way of life. Ireland accounts for around 0.1 per cent of total world
emissions of greenhouse gases. The major human emissions of G -Gs in re and inc udc
carbon dioxide (CO), methane (CH,+), and nitrous oxide. (N20). Energy. use is the single
most important conl"ributor of GHG s through the burning of fossd fuels. Agriculture is
the other major contributor. The relative importance of Irish emissions of the main gases
to the "Greenhouse Effect" is shown in the figure below.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
by type of gas
Ireland EU
Carbon Dioxide
57.0% Cart>on Dioxide
81.0%    ~.
Niltou$ Oxide
7.0%
~lilro+a s Oxide
14,O% thana
12.0%
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As pan of the EU negotiating staace Ireland has accepted a proposal to limit
national emissions in 2010 to 15 per cent above the 1990 baseline. This
allowance of an increase in emissions for Ireland, counpared to the cut for the EU
as a whole, is partial recognition of the lower level of development in Ireland in
1990, the base ),ear for calculations. It thus makes some special allowance to
permit Ireland’s convergence in living standard to the EU average over the 1990s
and the early years of the next decade. The purpose of this policy paper is to
consider what are likely to be the economic consequences for Ireland of meeting
such a target over the next 15 years.
The EU negotiating stance involves a commitment on limiting emissions of
total greenhouse gases, principally carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and
nitrous oxide N20) Of these three gases, carbon dioxide is the single biggest
contributor to the problem of global warming, accounting for over 80 per cent of
emissions from the EU. Methane is the next most important source. Carbon
dioxide generation due to economic development is chiefly a by-product of
burning fossil fuels to provide energy. In Ireland agricultural activity, in
particular the rearing of cattle and sheep, is the main source of methane
emissions. However, gas leaks are also a potentially important source of methane
emissions throughout the world.
In the case of Ireland, as shown in Box A, carbon dioxide accounts for
around 57 per cent of emissioas, while methane accounts for 29 per cent, and
nitrous oxide the remaining 14 per cent (Department of the Environment,
1997a). In considering the economic implications for Ireland of the EU
negotiating position it is clearly desirable to take account of the fact that the
proposed limitation on emissions covers methane as well as carbon dioxide. The
fact that Ireland has a very high level of methane emissions makes the Irish
position different from that of most other EU countries.
The approach taken in this paper is to use the available information to assess
the scale of the problem which Ireland faces in meeting the EU targets. In many
cases the information is inadequate, or limited to certain sectors. As a result, we
have had to Ibcus paris of the analysis on those sectors which are better
documented, such as electricity generation. However, in arriving at our
conclusions as to the appropriate policy response for Ireland v,,e make the best
use possible of all the limited information currently available for all sectors. This
allows us to make some preliminary recommendations on the appropriate policy
In calculating total emissions of these greenhouse gases the different gases are weighted
by their "greenhouse wanning poterttial’. I"or exarnple, weight for weight, methar~e does
more damage than carbon dioxide and it receives a higher weighting in aggregating the
different gases. While all Ihree gases contribute to global warming the EU has not yet
decided how to allocale emission targets among the different gases.
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stance for Ireland in inlplementing the overall strategy proposed for the EU.
Over the coming years we will need a much wider range of research evidence
covering all gases and all sectors if we are to achieve the targets set for Ireland
with minimtml disruption to the economy as a whole, and to employment in
particular.
To determine the cost of a particular set of emission limits it is first
necessary to establish a baseline estimate of energy consumption in the absence
of restrictions. In Chapter 2, therefore, we set out a methodology for forecasting
energy demand - the source of carbon dioxide. We do not prepare independent
forecasts for emissions of other gases, using instead those already prepared by
the Department of the Environment, 1997. Forecasting carbon dioxide involves a
detailed discussion of the appropriate measure to use for the elasticities of
demand for different types of energy. These elasticities are used in conjunction
with our latest macro-economic forecast to the year 2010 to generate a projection
of energy demand, with tile demand for energy from the road transport sector
and tile demand for electricity being separately identified. This forecast is
considered in the light of current levels of energy use in tile EU and forecasts for
future consmnption up to 2010.
Chapter 3 builds on tile projections of energy demand to produce a forecast
for emissions of carbon dioxide to the year 2010. This forecast is consistent with
the macro-ecmlomic scenario in the Medium-Term Review (Dully, Fitz Gerald,
Kearney and Shortall, 1997). The forecasts are put in context in Chapter 4 and
are compared with figures produced by other institutions both for Ireland and for
other countries.
Chapter 5 establishes a first set of estimates of the likely cost of meeting
differing targets Ibr greenhouse gases. Because of the limited range of data
available it concentrates on the abatement costs for the electricity industry. This,
in a sense, provides an upper bound of the possible cost of meeting the target on
greenhouse gases as it does not take adequate account of possible low cost
measures which are available in all other sectors of the economy and for the
other greenhouse gases. To arrive at the cost of meeting any particular emissions
target it is necessary to combine information on the likely emissions without
controls (from Chapter 3) with this information (in Chapter 5) on tile cost of
abatement.
In tile !igh| of the difference between Ireland’s target and the forecast of
emissions on the basis of unchanged policies described in Chapter 3, it is clear
that there will be a substantial gap to be bridged by policy changes in tile next
decade. Chapter 6 of this paper discusses how best to implement tile proposed
restriction on greenhouse gas emissions both at an EU level and, .assunling tile
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current EU approach of agreeing a set of national quotas is implemented, how
best these quotas call be implemented within Ireland (and other countries).
Chapter 6 first considers tile appropriate strategy at the level of the EU: the
advantages and disadvantages of using taxes, tradable quotas and non-tradable
quotas. The approach currently favoured at EU level involves the agreement of a
set of national quotas for greenhouse gas emissions. This chapter suggests that a
better approach would be to agree a common EU-wide tax on emissions. If
quotas remain tile favoured instrulnent then it is very important that tile quotas
should be tradable between countries. If such quotas were immutable, tile lack of
flexibility involved in such an approach could mean tbat tile targets set for the
EU may be reached at very much higher cost to the EU as a whole, in terms of
lost output, than under the other possible alternative strategies.
Chapter 6 also considers the appropriate domestic policy response to the
imposition of a national quota. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of
domestic taxes, quotas for domestic polluters and other regulatory approaches.
This section of tile report argues strongly for tile use of market-based
instruments to achieve the necessary target for emission reduction. Only through
tile use of such instrulnents - taxes or tradable quotas - can tile costs of meeting
the targets be distributed equally across domestic polluters and the cost to the
economy as a whole minimised. It is also vital that the right to pollute is not
granted "free" to individuals or firms: either taxes should be used to price
appropriately the right to pollute or else, where emission quotas are the chosen
instrument, they should be auctioned. Tile reason for advocating the use of
revenue raising measures (taxes or auctioned quotas) is that the revenue so raised
can be used to reduce other dislorling taxes, reducing tile cost of meeting the
environmental objective. Recent economic research shows that this is likely to
be an important feature of any strategy to tackle global warming at nlinimum
economic cost (Parry, Williams and Goulder, 1997 and Parry, 1997).
The final chapter of the report summarises our results on the dimension of
the economic problcnl filcing h’eland over tile next decade in tackling the
problem of global warming and it presents conclusions as to tile appropriate
future strategy for Ireland to implement.
Chapter 2
ENFRG Y DEMAND FORECASTS
2. I Introduction
Before making any assessment of the costs of meeting a particular emissions
target, knowledge of what emissions of each greenhouse gas would be under a
"do no|hing" scenario is necessary. As carbon dioxide, the principal greenhouse
gas, is emitted almost exclusively in the generation of energy, an energy demand
forecast is required before any statement about emissions can be made.
Energy demand is driven by economic growth and moderated by changes in
price. The elasticity of energy with respect to GDP - the percentage increase in
energy consumption given a one per cent increase in GDP - is an important
parameter in assessing die implications for energy demand of projected
economic growth. An elasticity of unity would imply that energy demand kept
pace exactly with growth in the economy, while an elaslicity of less than unity
would suggest a "decoupliag" from economic growth. The energy elasticity with
respect to price is equally imporlant in considering the impact of energy taxes or
external price shocks. Energy elasticities were estimated by Comliffe and Scott
(1990) for individual filels and for aggregate energy demand using data from tile
years 1960 to 1987. Since then however, not only have extra years of data
become available, but the Department of Transport, Energy and
Communications (as was) in their publication Energy in Ireland 1980-1993
(Myers, 1994) have made substantial revisions to fuel-quantity data for the
1980s. Thus it is very appropriate to repeat the estimation exercise at this point.
The six fuels considered are coal, turf, oil, LPG (liquefied petroleum gas),
piped gas (comprising both natural and town gas) and electricity. Ideally one
would like to forecast the demand for each fuel by each sector of the economy
and build up an overall picture from there. Unfortunately in moving to
increasingly disaggregated levels, the price and qtmntity data upon which any
cstinlation nlHSt bc based become ever more inconlplele. We gan analyse total
energy consumplion aggregated over all sectors and fuels and also examine
individtml Iilels aggregated over all sectors. In general, however, data
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deficiencies make sub-’divisions of fuels by sectors infeasible. However, data
from the Revenue Commissioners do make it possible to model the road
transport sector separately. This is due to the fact that this sector is almost the
sole consumer of petrol and diesel (as distinct from gasoil, which is taxed
differently). By remo.,,ing these two items from the aggregate energy and oil
models, the likelihood is increased of correctly identifying any other
relationships anlong the remaining fuels, in particular cross-price elasticities -
the effect on the demand for one fuel of a change in the price of another.
Although it is the primary requirement for a particular fuel .,.,’hich is
important for emissions purposes, quantities are measured initially in terms of
final demand, which is more closely linked to economic activity. In other words,
amounts of fuels used to manufacture other fuels are omitted from final
quantities. The common unit used to combine over fuels is the TOE (Tonne of
Oil Equivalent) and the "price" of aggregate energy is per "FOE. That is, the price
in a particular year is the total expenditure on all fuels in that year divided by the
total consumption (in TOE) in that year. The price can be calculated either with
or without VAT included and both prices ’,’*’ill be employed in later sections. In
analyses these prices will be deflated to express them in real terms.
The data from 1960 to 1987 are based on the data described by Scott (1990)
and used by Conniffe and Scott (1990), but have been revised in line with the
data changes given in EnerbgJ #I Ireland 1980-1993 and extended to 1995.
Following discussions with Bord na M6na, Bord Gzlis, and ESBI, coal
consumption in the years 1992-95 has been modified to compensate for
suspected under-reporting after the inception of the Single Market, and oil
constlmption by Augbinish Alumina has been deducted, as it is roughly constant
over time. Some other minor modifications have also been made. The non-
transport sectors of the economy will be modelled initially before the road
transport sector’s consumption of petrol and diesel is examined.
2.2 Aggregate Energy Consumption
Aggregate energy consumption excluding road transport - the domestic,
commercial, industrial and agricultural sectors - has risen steadily since the
1960s. Figure 2. t sbows the growth pattern from 1960 to 1995.
Apart from the oil price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80, the pattern is one of
rapid growth when GDP is increasing strongly (as in the1960s), and no growth
or even decline whell GDP is static (as in the early and mid-1980s). However, it
is quite possible that factors other than economic growth may be in operation,
either influencing energy demand directly, or indirectly through altering the rates
at which energy demand responds to GDP or price changes. For example, it
could be argued that Irish industrial growth in recent years has been in less
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energy-intensive seclors tllan ill Ihe past and also that the two great price hikes of
tile 1970s lriggered tile development of more energy efficient equipment and
praclices. It is reasonable to suppose some permcmem reduction in the GDP
elasticity - compared to its value in the 1970s and earlier - from the operation of
such factors. However, as has been discussed in Coaniffe (1993), it is easy to
overesthnate the size of such redncdons and the permanence of some of their
components. For example, improved efficiency of energy-use obtained through
progressive changes in tl~e fuel-mix may only be possible for a finite number of
),ears. This poinl will be elaborated on in a later section.
F igu re 2. I : Final Non- Tran.~7~ort Consumption of Energy Onillion TOE) 1960-95
6
I [ I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1965 1990 19<35
$
Regressions of(log) aggregate energy on (log) real price and (log) real GDP
for d~e whole t960-1994 period and also for the sub-periods 1960-1981 and
1981-1994 gave the elasticity estimates and goodness-of-fit measures shown in
Table 2.1. The Durbin-Walson value (DW) is important as an indicator of the
plausibility of die underlying model, with values near 2 highly acceptable, but
values near zero suspicious. Unless otherwise staled, prices are inclusive of
VAT.
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Table 2. I : Total Ener~, - Goodness-of-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years           R2          DW       Price Elasticity      GDP Elasticity
1960-1994 0.90 0.42 -0.16 ns 0.68 ***
1960-1981 0.96 1.92 -0.40 *** 1.07 ***
1981-1994 0.91 1.46
ns = not statistically signilicant at 5",4 level
** = statistically significant at t% level.
level.
-0.25 * 0.31 ***
¯
. = statistically significant at 5% level.
¯
** = statistically significant at 0.1°,4
The elasticities estimated over the whole period seem to show no price effect
and a GDP elasticity of about 0.7. However, the model is not a good fit to the
data as the low Durbin-Walson statistic shows. Further diagnostic tests confirm
this lack of fit and shov,, that the model considerably overestimates aggregate
energy consumption in the later years of the period. This could be improved
were one to add any variable that is constaut for much of the period, but with
increasing values towards the end or the period. But introducing such an
arbitrary variable is tmdesirable and it is more revealing to estimate over sub-
periods. Table 2. I also shows that equations for 1960- } 981 and 198 I- 1994 fit the
data quite well aud show significant negative price elasticities, which are
theoretically plausible. The big contrast between sub-periods, however, is the
much smaller GDP elasticity in the later period, st,ggesting a "decoupling" of
energy from economic growth after the second oil price hike. From what has
already been said. some reduction in GDP elasticity between periods is plausible,
but could the later elasticity fall to less than a third of its previous value, or be
plausibly expected to rcmaiu that low?
It will be argued later th~lt a large part of the apparent fall in GDP elasticity
is because aggregate energy expressed in TOE terms is not a good measure of
useful energy, since the end-use eMciencics of fuels are not taken into account.
In chemical energy conlent terms, a unit of TOE in coal equals a unit of TOE in
piped gas, but in combustion much less of the coal energy malerialises as useful
heat. The TOE measure of final deliveries of energy may be proportional to
useful energy, when the fuel-mix is held constant, but can diverge when the mix
is changing." This can lead to underestimation of useful energy in TOE when a
filel with a higher end-use eftlcicncy is substituted for one with lower end-use
efficiency. Before continuing with this argument, it is necessary to look at the
changes in consumption of individual fiJels.
2 In fact useful ericrgy would be n’tore closely related to economic activity than final
demand, and would bc easier to model - if one could measure it.
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2.3 Consumption of Individual Fuels
In these analyses the equations are fitted over the whole period and over
1960 to 1981, bu! not for the remaining sub-period to 1994. The reason is that
with individual fuels tbe prices of competing fuels are obviously variables of
interest, so that equations contain a minimun~ of eigbt coefficients. As a result,
separate estimation over the remaining years leaves too few observations for
useful inference. Instead they are fitted for 1975-1994. Tbis overlapping of sub-
periods is not desirable, but better tban entirely ignoring the possibility of
structural changes in the equations for individual fuels.
Figure 2,2: Total Final Consumption of Coal (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
1400
1200
1000
800
600
4O0
200 I I I ~ I ~ I ~ I I I I I T I I I ~ I I I I I I I I I I I q I I I I I I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1£85 1990 1995
The pattern of coal consumption over time is clear from Figure 2.2. Coal
consumption declined unlil die first oil price crisis, lheu rose in substitution for
oil, before falling sleadily from 1986 onwards when oil prices fell dramatically.
By 1994 quantily had fallen to 55 per cent of its 1986 volume. Besides prices (of
coal and of rival fuels) and GDP, special factors affect demand for coal,
including its "dirtiness" compared Io some other fuels and the legal restrictions
on the use of smoky coal in urban areas Ihat were introduced in 1990. Table 2.2
shows goodness-of-fit measures and 1he own-price and GDP elasticities from the
estimated model. Nole that die model for this and other fuels contaiued other
variables also.
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Table 2.2: Coal - Goodness-of-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years         R2        DW     Price Elasticity GDP Elasticity
1960- 1994 0.64 0.60
- 1.00 ns 0.49 ns
1960-1981 0.54 0.60 - 1.26 ns 0.50 ns
1975- 1994 0.92 1.46 +0.24 ns 0.21 ns
Evidently tile model fitted over tile whole period is not a good fit and the
model estimated for the first sub-period is not particularly good either. But the
low GDP elasticities do make some sense. As GDP grows and housebolds
become more affluent, the inconvenience of coal leads to switching to other
fuels. There were significant cross-price elasticities with oil, electricity and gas,
wbicb makes sense in view of the rise in coal consumption in the later 1970s
shown in Figure 2.2. Indeed, coal consumption could be modelled quite well in
terms of a time trend, a dummy variable for legislation, and the price ratio of
coal to oil, without including GDP at all. However, the key factor is that the
quantity of coal (not just its share) has been declining and must be expected to
continue to do so. Indeed, modelling coal from its high point in 1986 on would
give a significantly negative elasticity of-1.87.
Turf consumption is given in Figure 2.3. Some of the comments made about
coal may apply to turf also, though not to the same extent. For example, peat
briquettes were classified as "clean" fuel for domestic use in urban areas in the
1990 legislation. However, Figure 2.3 does not suggest that turf consumption is
likely to be positively related to GDP and the elasticities in Table 2.3 confirm
this.
Table 2.3: Turf- Goodness-qf-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years Re DW Price Elasticity    GDP Elasticity
1960-1994 0.77 1.52 0.15 ns -0.21 ns
1960- 1981 0.86 1.37
-0. I 0 ns -0.50 ns
1975- 1994 0.87 2.58 0.06 ns -0.29 ns
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F igu re 2.3 : Total Final Consumpt ion of Turf (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
800
70a
O
60(3
50(3 I 1 I I ~ I ~ ~ I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1~0 1985 1990 1995
The pattern ofoil consumption over time is shown in Figure 2.4. Oil is by far
the largesl fuel in TOF: terms, even when one removes d~at portion consumed by
road transport (other forms of transport remain included), and so its elasticity
will have particular importance in determining the aggregate energy elasticity.
The estimates from the equations are in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Oil - Goochless-qf-Fit Measures and Elasticities
)%,ars          R2         DW      Price Elasticity GDPElasticio~
1960-1994 0.87 0.95 -0.05 ns 0.41 ns
1960-1981 0.97 1.12 0.30 ns 0.86 ns
1975-1994 0.91 2.57 -0.20 *** 0.18 ns
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Figure 2.4: Total Final Consumption of Oil (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
The full-period equation fits badly in terms of the Durbin-Watson statistic,
while the sub-period equations seem better behaved. Ahhough the GDP
elasticity is not statistically significant in either sub-period, the fall between
periods may be due to evolution of tile economy towards less energy-intensive
sectors. More of it may be due to teclmological advances, motivated by tile oil
price hikes, that led to greater energy efficiency. Tbese could be described as
bidden, or indirect, price effects, which bare manifested tbemselves as falls in
tile GDP elasticity. The [’act that tile price of oil is only significaut in tile latter
period is probably due to tile fact that oil had no serious competitors as a fiJel
until the coming on stream of natural gas, and as a result did not became
sensitive to price changes until that lime.
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I:igure 2.5: Total Final Consuml)z’o 1 of LPG (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
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Figure 2.5 shows the LPG consumption pattern over time. Consumption
obviously climbed steadily until the end of the 1970s and then remained rather
static. Table 2.5 gives the elasticities.
Table 2.5: LPG - Goodness-of-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years          R2         Dll"      Price Elasticity    GDP Elasticity
1960-1994 0.92 0.76 0.56 ns 1.5 ns
1960- 1981 0.98 1.98 0.06 as 2.30 ***
1975- 1994 0.78 1.75 -0.32 ns 0.43 ns
Again the full-period equation has a significantly low Durbin-Watson
statistic. Althotlgh the first sub-period shows strong growth with GDP, the
sccond shows none, whicll accords with what Figure 2.5 suggests. There were
changcs in the energy market in the early 1980s, besides the enduring effects of
the oil price hikes. With the introduction of natural gas, piped gas changed its
naturc dramatically, becoming a major competitor to other fuels and helping
create the diffcrences between sub-periods. Indeed. as is the case with coal, the
renlism of a positive GDP elasticity for LPG is questionable, and if one regresses
over Ihe period when natural gas became a serious competitor, one emerges with
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an elasticity of about -0.1. The pattern for piped gas itself shows this
dramatically as illustrated in Figure 2.6 and it is easy to guess what the equations
and elasticity estimates will show. The elasticities are given in Table 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Tatal Final Consumption of Piped Gas (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
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Table 2,6: Piped Gtts - Goodness-of-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years          R2         DW      Price Elasticity    GDP Elasticity
1960-1994 0,98 1,22
-1~05 *** 1,33 ***
1960-1981 0.92 1.26 -0.92 *** 1.13 **
1975- 1994 0.99 1.75
-0.83 *** 2.23 ***
Piped gas has changed from a fuel with a GDP elasticity near unity to a fuel
with a very high GDP elasticity and quite sizeable price elasticity. It is not
surprising that the model fitted over the whole period should show a low Durbin-
Watson value.
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Figure 2.7: Total Final Consllmption of Electricity (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
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F’iaally, the consumption of electricity from 1960 to 1995 is shown in Figure
2.7. Consumption grew steadily over the full period with minor (relative to some
other fuels) fluctuations associated witb the oil price bikes. The elasticities are in
Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Electricity - Goochless-of-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years          Re         DI.V      Price Elasticity    GDP Elasticity
1960- 1994 0.98 0.60 -0.86 as 1.22 ***
1960-1981 0.99 1.32 -I.30 ** 1.60 ***
1975-1994 0.99 1.68 0.14 ns 0.91 ***
Again, the sub-period equations fit better than the overall equation and there
is evidence of a fall in the GDP elasticity, but it remains substantial. The change
from being highly price elastic to no price effect seems strange, but it should be
remembered tlmt the prices of other fuels are in all these models, so there are
colinearity effects as well as complicating cross-price elasticities.
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2.4 ReturninA, to the Aggregate Energy GDP Elasticity
The G DP elasticity of aggregate energy can be thought of as a weighted sum
of individual fuel elasticities, just as aggregate energy is ilselfa weighted sum of
fuel quantities. So it is easy to see why the whole period elasticity of aggregate
energy is 0.68 in Table 2.1. The fuels witb elasticities near to or greater than
+1.0, piped gas and electricity, are counterbalanced to a degree by the fuels with
low or negative elasticities, coal, oil, LPG and turf. However, if coal and turf are
ever declining quantities, the aggregate GDP elasticity must move towards a
weighted sum of the elasticities of the otber four fuels. If the whole period
elasticities for these fiJcls still held good, this would imply an increase in the
GDP elasticity of aggregate energy as coal and turf disappear.
However all of these fiJels have shown decreases in their elasticities, and the
aggregate elasticity for the second period is less than a third of what it was prior
to 1980. What has caused this dramatic drop? Part of the reason is the rapid
decline in coal consumption since the mid-1980s (Figure 2.2). However, there is
a deeper explanation. The fall in coal quantity from 1.2m TOE in 1986 to 0.64m
"FOE in 1994 was more than matched by increases in other fuels. Over the same
years, for example, the TOE quantities of piped gas increased from 0.41m to
0.83m. But the net increase in TOE greatly underestinlates the net increase in
"useful" energy, since coal is a low-efficiency fuel. Thus, when the fuel-mix is
switcbiug towards fuels with higher end-use efficiencies, an increase in GDP
will require less of an increase in "FOE terms than if the fuel-mix is held
constant. But when the mix stabilises again, the former elasticity would be
expected to reappear. Weighting according to stated latter period elasticities and
including a coal eh~sticity of-I.87 suggests a GDP elasticity for aggregate
energy of 0.34 rising to 0.75 - the weighted sum of the elasticities of oil, LPG,
gas and electricity- when coal and turf disappear from the mix.
Of course, given that coal and turf have fallen to current levels, the end-use
efficiency g~fin is becoming less important. Coal will continue to face the
combination of adverse legislative and convenience factors, but will just vanish
out of the mix if it continues to decrease by the annual amounts of recent years.
Turf still has about I I per cent of final non-transport energy demand and there
may be scope here for switching to higher end-use efficiency fuels. However, the
efl~ct c:mnot be of lhe i11agnitude of the substitution for coal, since that fuel
comprised over a fifth of all non-transport energy in 1986. The substantial
quantity of turf accounted for by consumption by the producer in rural areas may
be a complicating factor as is the likelihood of the continued definition of turf as
a "clean" fi~el for urban areas.
The corollary of this reduced end-use efficiency gain may be a fall in the gas
elasticity, as it seems that this fuel has benefited most from Ihe sv,,itching out of
ENERGY DEMAND FORECASTS 19
coal and turf. most probably through tile installation of gas central heating in
homes. It is unclear what proportion of the gas elasticity is due to this factor, and
there is certainly still scope for the expansion of the network, but it seems quite
possible that the aggregate elasticity may not reach its 0.75 asymptote, at least
not by 2010. In addition, there may, of course, be further evolution of the
manufacturing sector away fi’om cnergy intensive industry, progress on energy
conservation measures and perhaps technical advances improving the energy
efficiency of appliances. Although it would be un’*vise to count on such
developments, a GDP elasticity of non-transport energy consumption of 0.65 by
2010 seems plausible.
As regards price elasticity, in the later sub-period oil and gas showed
significantly negative price elasticities, both quite large in magnitude, while LPG
and electricity elasticities were not signilicantly different from zero. However,
the position is complicated by cross-elasticities because of possibilities of
substitution between fuels. For example, in the later period, gas ’.’*’as a keen rival
ofoil for domestic central beating. So it is not plausible to think of an aggregate
price elasticity as a weighted sum of individual fael elasticities. The elasticity
estimate of-0.25 from the later sub-period of Table 2.1 may be a little low (in
absolute terms) on the s~mle argument of tmderestimation of useful energy. In
other words, when prices fell in the mid-1980s, tile efficiency gain may have
prevented demand from rising as much as it otherwise would have if the Fuel mix
had stayed constant. However, it cannot be greatly tmderestimated, because the
estimate For the earlier sub-perlod in Table 2.1 was -0.45, and estimates
appearing in the international literature for other countries generally find
aggregate energy to be price inelastic, often with an elasticity of about -0.4. For
these reasons and for another to be mentioned in tile next section, the price
elasticity will be assunled to be -0.35. Of course, massive price rises on the scale
of the oil crises in the 1970s- perhaps now more likely in gas than in oil - could
have extra effects, including changes to the GDP elasticity as discussed in
Conniffe (1993). But For forecasting purposes, the future scenario does not
include such a crisis possibility. The estimates of elasticities to 2010 are
summarised in Table 2.8.
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Table 2.8: Price and GDP Elasticities
Year Aggregate GDP Elasticities
Price
Elasticities Coal Oil    Turf LPG Gas Elec. Agg.
1995 -0.35 -I.87 0.18 -0.29 -0.10 2.23 0.91 0.36
2000 -0.35 -1.87 0.18 -0.29 -0.10 * 0.91 0.41
2005 -0.35 -1.87 0.18 -0.29 -0.10 * 0.91 0.52
2010 -0.35 -I.87 0.18 -0.29 -0.10 * 0.91 0.65
* To be determined residually.
2.5 Sens#ivit.v Tests
Energy constmlption bas risen over time partly because increases in
household incomes lead to greater expenditures on energy-using appliances and,
more importantly, because energy is one of the inputs required to generate the
increased output that raised national income. GDP, rather than GNP, seems a
more appropriate "iucome" variable, because it refers to all production in
Ireland, even if some profits resulting fi’om production by subsidiaries of foreign
firms are repatriated to other countries. However, it is sometimes suggested tbat
some manipulation of profit repatriation has the effect of exaggerating GDP
growth. Overestimation of GDP growth in recent years could, of course, also
explain the model’s overestimation of energy demand. Also, as regards
households’ expenditures, GNF’ could be argued to be tile more plausible
determinant. However, replacing GDP by GNP in the analyses did not make a
greal difference. Table 2.9 shows bow tbe analysis of aggregate energy, given
previously in Table 2. I, is affected by using GNP instead of GDP.
Table 2.9: Total I-ner~kg~ - Goodness-¢?]-Fit Measures and Elasticities (Price and GNP)
)’ears R2 D W Price GNP (GDP Elasticity,
ElasticiO, Elasticilv previously estimated)
1960-1994 0.94 0.67 -0.17 ** 0.83 *** (0.68)
1960-1981 0.96 1.88 -0.31 *** 1.07 *** (1.07)
1981-1994 0.92 1.57 -0.23 ** 0.37 ** (0.31)
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The fit of the models may be slightly better and the price elasticities for the
two periods closer together to the estimate of the previous section, but the major
drop in GNP elasticities between periods parallels that of Table 2.1 for GDP
elasticities. As patterns Ibr individual fuels were also similar to those shown
earlier, a GNI:’ rather than GDP based analysis does not produce significantly
different resu Its.3
In analyses prices were deflated by the consumption deflator. Since tbis
refers to prices faced by households and much energy is used for production
purposes, the GDP det]ator is perhaps theoretically more appropriate. On the
other hand, revisions to national accouats al’e not unconlnlon for a few years
atier an accounting year and can be substantial, so thai the GDP deflator cannot
be assumed fillalised Ibr several years. So, for example, Conniffe and Scott
(1990) used the consumption deflator v.,ben analysing data up to 1987, but
Conniffe (1993) used the GDP denator with data also running to 1987. However,
choice of dellator rarely makes much difference, nor did it in these analyses
when the GDP deflator was used.
Working with prices net of VAT made little difference to analyses of
aggregate energy, although it did matter to some degree for some individual
fiJels. While much of industry can reclaim VAT, some firms and all households
cannot and so it is not immediately apparent whether fuel prices should be
inclusive or exclusive of VAT. In theory, the appropriate prices could be decided
by regressing on prices net of VAT with the VAT rates as extra variables. If net
prices are appropriate, the coefficients on VAT variables should not be
signiftcant, while if prices with VAT included are appropriate, tbe coefficients
should be significant (if the prices are) and of the same order of magnitude. The
coefficients generally were signilicant suggesting that VAT inclusive prices
were best. However, in tbe case of aggregate energy and some fuels, with
equations fitted over the whole period, coefficients were far larger in magnitude
than ’.voukl bc expected. The reason is that VAT rates were zero until well
through the period, so that they act as proxies "catching" model over-estimation
in the later ),ears discussed after Table 2.1.
2.6 The Road Tnm,~7)ort Sector
Diesel and petrol consumplioo by Ihe transport sector can be modelled
separately from the rest of lhe economy, allowing greater precision in our
Iorecasls. This sector can be broken dov.,n in tv,,o components, public and
private. Public transport (buses) primarily uses diesel, while private transport
3 It coukt nonetheless produce signilicarttly different lorecasls if growth in projected GNP
was al variance with grov.,th in GDP. However. as will be seer~ later, this is not the case.
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(cars and goods vehicles) uses both petrol and diesel. The forces driving both
sectors are different and as a result they are examined separately. The modelling
procedure for public transport consumption of diesel is similar to that employed
in the aggregate analysis, with economic growth seen as the principal driving
force. Figure 2.8 shows the growth pattern since 1960.
Figure 2.8: Public Transport Consumption of Diesel (thousand TOE) 1960-1995
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Consumption has risen slowly over the thirty-five year period, with dips for
the two oil-price hikes. One would expect a moderate growth elasticity and
indeed that is what one finds (’Fable 2.10), although GNP produces better results
than GDP. Price does not seem to be a driving factor at all. Sub-period analyses
yield similar estimates, so that the GNP elasticity of 0.66 seems relatively stable.
Table 2. I 0: Public Transport Diesel - Goo~h~ess-ofi Fit Measures and
Elasticities
Fears R2 DHz Price Elasticity    GNP Elasticity
1960- 1995 0.89 1.41 -0.05 ns 0.66 ** *
Figure 2.9 shows private transport consumption of petrol and diesel. Petrol
consumption grew steadily until the second oil-price shock and tben fell back. It
has since regained ground but only returned to its 1980 level in 1995. Diesel has
been the main beneficiary of this, lower prices (relative to petrol) and a
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perception of greater efficiency helping to accelerate its growth rapidly after
1980 so that its consumption is now only just below that of petrol.
Modelfing both fuels separately against GNP produces elasticities of I.I 1 for
petrol and 2.6 for diesel with very bad fits (in terms of the Durbin-Watson
statistic) in both cases. This suggests that a different approach is desirable.
Unlike other sectors of the economy, where energy is consumed by a whole
range of devices of differing sizes and efficiency, energy in the private transport
sector is consumed ahnost solely by one type of device, namely, the motor
vehicle. Although tbere are different classes of vebicle, wbose efficiency has
undoubtedly improved over time, these devices are still much more homogenous
than tbose that are used in any other sector. This suggests a two-stage process for
modelling consumption: first regress tbc quanlity of oil (petrol plus diesel) on
tbe number of vehicles, and second, regress the number of vehicles on GNP.
Figure 2.9: Petrol arid Diesel Cons’umption 1960-1995 (thousand TOE)
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Figure 2.10: Indices of Growth in the Stock of Cars and Private Transport
Consumption of Petrol and Diesel (I 980= 100)
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Figure 2.10 shows the pattern of growlh of private transport consumption of
oil and the stock of cars. The relationship seems to be quite close, both rising
steadily throughout the period with a noticeable dip after the second oil shock.
Table 2.11, showing the elasticities derived, includes a technology term in
the form of the cumulative sum of the positive changes in the price of oil, as
suggested by Conniffe (1993). That is, technology improvements are motivated
by increases in the price of oil, with (in this case) a lag of four years before the
improvement takes effect. The model produces a relatively stable vehicle
elasticity of 1.00 over the whole period. This seems to suggest that, unless
perturbed by changes in price - which have both an immediate effect and a
delayed technology effect - oil consumption keeps pace exactly with the number
of vehicles, or, in other words, that there is no increase in the efficiency of cars,
even allowing Ibr the switching from petrol to diesel. However, one must
remember that this does not take account of one important factor, namely the
utilisation of each vehicle. Although, unfortunately, a complete time-series of
data is not available for this, per capita vehicle kilometres of road travel have
increased some 47 per cent over the past ten years, rising from 5,990 km per
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person ill 1986 tO 8,800 km per person in 1995.~ The number of cars on the road
has increased by 39 per cent over the same period, suggesting an increase in
utilisation of each vehicle of just over 7 per cent. A GNP elasticity of unity is
therefore plausible.
Table 2.1 I : Private Transport Oil - Goodness-of-Fit Measures and Elasticities
Years R2 DW Price Stock of Cars Technology
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
1960-1995 0.99    1.71
-0.23 *** 1.00 ***
-0.55 ***
Modelling the stock of cars, including terms for GNP, the price of cars
(making allowances Ibr depreciation and interest-rate changes), and the price of
oil, gives the estimates shown in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12: Stock of Cars - Goodness-of-fit Measures and Elasticities
Years R2 DW Own Price Oil Price GNP
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
1960- 1995 0.97 0.22 -0.46 ns 0.23 * 1.63 ***
1960-1981 0.99 0.77 -0.70 **
-0.06 ns 1.79 ***
1981-1995 0.99 2.73 -0.70 ***
-0.06 ns 0.66 ***
The model estimated over the whole period is unsatisfactory, with a very
strong GNP elasticity, but an insignificant own-price elasticity and a positive oil-
price elasticity. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that the fit of the
model is very poor. However the sub-periods are reasonably well behaved, with
a GNP elasticity of 0.66 and u high and significant own-price elasticity of-0.70
in the latter period.
2. 7 Energy Demand Forecasts - No Policy Change
The methodology for forecasting energy demand to the year 2000 relies on
the comprehensive macro-economic Forecasts given in the ESRI’s Medium-Term
Review." 1997-2003. These Forecasts are based on the assulnptions that real
energy prices show only a slnall rise over the period to 2010 and that there are no
Departmcnt of the Environment (1997b), p. 105.
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new environmental restrictions on the growth of the energy sector. The price of
motor vehicles is assumed to track the general price level, although the economic
cost to the consumer will vary with interest rate changes. These forecasts
constitute the "no policy change" scenario. Table 2.13 gives details of the
forecast growth rates for the major aggregates out to tile year 2010.
Table 2.13: Cemral Forecast, Major A ggregales
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005-
95     O0     05      10
GNP 6.4 5.7 5.9 5.3
GDP 7.5 6.5 5.8 5.7
Consumptio 2.2 2. I 1.9 2. I
n Deflator
Population    0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4
Employment 3.6 3.1 3.9 2.9
Interest Rate 6.0 6.0 5.8 4.2
growthrates(%)
4.4 4.7 5.6 5.0 4.2
4.8 5.8 5.9 5.2 4.2
2.2 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2
0.4        0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
1.5 1.8 3.0 2.0 1.5
%
4.9 9.8 5.6 5.6 5.4
Forecasts for the key macro-economic aggregates are combined with the
estimated elasticities, given in the previous section, to produce our energy
forecasts. First a forecast for total final consumption of energy is derived using
the aggregate non-transport elasticity. Then forecasts for electricity, coal, LPG
and turf are derived using the individual fi)el elasticities. Demand for gas is then
determined as a residual and the resulting GDP elasticity is calculated. In the
case of gas, the elasticity declines steadily over time, reflecting the assumption
that the penetration of the market by gas will slow as most major urban centres
become connected to the network and the scope for fuel switching is reduced.
Private transporl demand for oil is modelled on the stock of cars, which is itself
calculated using the appropriate GNP elasticity.
On tile basis of the economic growth projections we have estimated the final
demand for each kind of energy, all expressed in TOE (Tolmes of Oil
Equivalent). The results are set out in Table 2.14.
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Table 2.14: Forecast Final Energy Demand (thousand TOE) 1990-2010
1990     1995    2000    2005    2010
Coal 860 551 334 203 123
Oil (Non-Transport) 1,868 2,348 2,457 2,572 2,692
Turf 760 615 571 530 492
LPG 148 148 144 141 137
Gas 605 869 1,277 1,738 2,384
GDP elasticity of Gas 2.23 2.23 1.35 1.23 1.34
Electricity 1,032 1,284 1,610 2,019 2,532
Oil (Private Transport) 1,590 2,113 2,549 2,985 3,434
Stock of Cars (thousand) 796 990 1,194 1,397 1,606
Oil (Public Transport) 41 46 55 65 74
Oil (Aughinish Alunlina) 228 101 200 200 200
Total Final Consumption
Change ol2 1990
7,132 8,075 9,199    10,452 12,068
13.2% 29.0% 46.6% 69.2%
Over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2010 we are forecasting that GDP will
grow by around 5.1 per cent a year on average although this average could be as
high as 6 per cent per 3’ear or as low as 3.5 per cent~. At the same time the
demand for final energy is forecast to rise at 2.75 per cent a 3,ear. The result
would be that final energy consumption in 2010 under a "do nothing" scenario
would be around 12.1 million TOE+ 69 per cent inore than in 1990. The growth
in electricity consumption over the period would be around 4.6 per cent a year
oil average. Private transport consumption of oil will become the largest single
component estilnated here, mostly because of the significant rise in the number
of motor vehicles: the stock of cars is expected to rise from 796,000 in 1990 to
over 1.6 inillion by 2010.
5 In undertaking the modelling and energy demand we must use consistent GDP data.
These are only available on the ESA79 basis while the average g, rowlh rates shown above
in tile Ibrecast table are on tile later ESA95 basis.
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As Table 2.15 shows, however, this would not put us out of line
internationally. Cars per inhabitant would rise from 263 per thousand in 1994 to
420 per thousand in 2010, just below the present-day European average.
Table 2.15: Private Cars per thousand h~habitants by Country, 1994
Country Private Cars per thousand Inhabitants
Ireland 263
Ireland 2010 420
EUI5 423
Denmark 309
Germany 488
Greece 199
Spain 35 I
France 430
Italy 518
The Netherlands 383
UK 373
USA 514
Source: Eurostot (1996).
Chapter 3
FORECAST CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
In forecasting CO2 emissions it is not enough to have total final consumption
figures for the various fuels, since the emissions due to electricity will depend on
the fuel-mix and the efficiency of generation. The principal adjustment which
needs to be made in doing this is in converting a given final consumption of
electricity back to a primary reqnirement for coal, oil, turf, LPG and gas
(ignoring generation using renewable energy sources which does not emit carbon
dioxide). Historical figures are available from the energy balance sheets and we
have assumed that all marginal electricity production is generated using
combined-cycle gas turbines, which burn gas at an increased efficiency of 55 per
cent. This enables us to produce figures for the primary energy requirement of
all emitting fuels out to 2010 as shown in Table3.1 below.6 Theprimary
"Fable 3. I: PrimaO, Enert3~ Requirement for Fossil Fuels 1990-2010 (thousand TOE)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Coal 2,175 2,088 1,871 1,740 1,660
Turf 1,352 1,191 1,147 1,106 1,068
Oil 4,074 5,239 5,954 6,591 7,265
LPG 148 148 144 141 137
Gas 1,448 1,991 2,952 4,104 5,619
Total Fossil Fuel 9,197 10,657 12,068 13,682 15,749
C77ange on 1990 15,9% 31.2% 48.8% 71.2%
t’ We do not produce forecasts for the primary energy requirement for renewable energy
sources, since Ihere is not enough data available to do so accurately. In any case they
account for a vet), small proportion oflotal energy and do not emit carbon dioxide.
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requirements for coal and turf decline steadily over the period, as one would
expect given their elasticities. The requirement for oil almost doubles, due
mainly to growth in transport, and gas increases threefold, mainly in the
electricity sector.
When a tonne of oil equivalent of each fuel is burned, it releases a specific
amount of carbon dioxide. These emission factors can vary from country to
country, depending on, among other things, the purity of the fuel. The emission
factors used in this analysis are given in Table 3.2 below and correspond with
those employed to compile the national inventories given in the Department of
the Environment’s publication Irelcmd." Second National Communication under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997a).
Different grades of oil release different amounts of carbon dioxide, so without
forecasts for all grades we must use a composite emission factor. Some
differentiation is possible, however: the emission factor for heavy fuel oil used in
power generation is higher than that for petrol and diesel used in private
transport. Similarly, turf used in power generation is primarily milled turf which
has a higher emission factor than the turf or briquettes which make up the bulk
of final turf consumption.
Table 3.2: Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors
Fuel Tonne/TOE
Coal 3.59
Oil (Final Non-Transport) 3.05
Oil (Private Transport) 3.00
Oil (Public Transport) 3.06
Oil (Power Generation) 3.18
Turf(Final Consumption) 4.30
Turf (Power Generation) 4.8 I
LPG 2.67
Gas 2.30
By muhiplying the primary energy requirement of each fuel by the relevant
emission factor we can derive emission figures for that fuel and build up a total
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picture.7 As one can see in "Fable 3.3, because coal and turf are carbon-intensive
fuels, their share of emissions is considerably higher than their share of total
energy. Total emissions are predicted to grow at a very rapid rate, even allowing
for all growth in electricity to be generated by high-efficiency, low-emission gas.
This means that by 2010. if there is no change in policy, Ireland could be
releasing over 47 million tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere annually,
a 53 per cent increase on 1990 figures.
Table 3.3: Total CO2 Emissions by I:’uel i~t, I/olume under Current Regime
(thousand I olmes)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Coal 7,800 7,488 6,710 6,238 5,952
Turf 6,118 5,418 5,228 5,053 4,889
Oil 12,396 15,958 18,127 20,058 22,105
LPG 395 395 385 376 366
Gas* 4.319 5.552 7.841 10,578 14,154
Total 31.029    3,1,81 I 38,291 42,303 47,467
Change on 1990 12.2% 23.4% 36.3% 53.0%
* Includes non-energy emissions.
It is interesting to note that tile Forecasts for both energy demand and for
emissions in 2000 are very close to the forecasts made for that date in Fitz
Gerald and McCoy (1992). Five ),ears ago total primary energy requirement in
2000 was forecast to reach 12.7 million TOE giving rise to 38.6 million tonnes
of CO2. Today our Central Forecast is for consumption of 12.1 million TOE
(excluding renewable energy sources) with emissions of 38.3 inillion tolmes of
C02.
Table 3.4 shows CO2 emissions by sector. Emissions in tile electricity sector
are expected to increase faster than total emissions, rising From 12.9 million
IOlltlcs in L995 Io ahnosI 18.5 million tOlW~es by 2010, a 75 pcr cent increase on
1990. with Ihc biggest growth being in generation by gas. The share of total
7 We ignore here the issue of"carbon sir, ks" - the absorption of carbor, dioxide by trees
and olhcr vegetation - the Ire[anlenl or which has 11ot yel been finalised in intcmatior~al
methodology.
32 THE COSTS TO IRELAND OF GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT
emissions contributed by the sector is expected to rise slowly over the period to
39 per cent by 2010. The share eomributed by the road trat~tsport sector is also
expected to rise, although not as sharply as occurred between 1990 and 1995. By
2010 the road transport sector will be emitting over 10 million tounes, more than
double what its total was in 1990.
Table 3.4: COe Emissions by Sector by Volume under Current Regime (thousand
Ionnes)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Change
oll 1990
Transport               4,896 6,481 7,817 9,154 10,528 115.0%
% oftotalemissions 15.8% 18.6% 20.4% 21.6% 22.2%
Other Final(excI. Elec.) 14,536 14,484 15,085 15,836 17.229 18.5%
% oftotalemissions 46.8% 41.6% 39.4% 3Z4% 36.3%
Non-Energy* 989 973 1,052 1.138 1,230 24.4%
.Share of total emissions 3.2% 2.8% 2. 7% 2. 7% 2.6%
Power Generation 10,608 12,872 14,337 16,175 18,479 74.2%
af which: Cool 4.716 5.512 5,512 5,512 5,512 16.9%
Turf 2.850 2. 773 2,773 2, 773 2. 773 -2.7%
Oil 1.103 2.007 2,201 2,445 2,754 149.7%
Gas 1.939 2.581 3.850 5,444 7,440 283.7%
% o]’total emissions 34.2% 37.0% 37.4% 38.2% 31~’.9%
Total 31,029 34,811 38,291 42,303 47,467 53,0%
* Principally manul~cture of fcrtilisers.
Chapter 4
OUR FORECASTS hV CONTE.,TI"
4. I Introduction
Over tile period I¥om 1990 to 2010, we are forecasting a 69 per cent increase
in final energy constunplion, a 71 per cent increase in primary energy and a 53
per cent increase ill carbon dioxide emissions. These are indeed large numbers,
but it is worth noting that they still represent a significant decoupling of energy
from economic growth and, furthermore, a decoupling of carbon dioxide
emissions from growth in energy. They also imply an improvement in tile
efficiency of electricity generation. The trends in these aggregates are illustrated
in I:igure 4.1 which shows indices of projected growth in GDP, total primary
energy requiremcllt (TPI’]R) aud CO2 emissions. It is high economic growth
which is driving forecast energy and emissions, rather than a high GDP
elasticity, or switching towards carbon-intensive fuels.
Alternative Scemtrios
This is worth keeping in inind when COlnparing our Ibrecasts with those
produced by other institutions, both for Ireland and for other countries. The
government’s stated target for CO2 elnissions is that they should not exceed 37
inillioll tonnes in the year 2000.s The Department of the Eiwirolunent (1997a)
projects that Irekmd will meet that target, with emissions reaching 35 million
tonues by the end of the decade and 40.8 million tolmes by 2010. Compared to
our prediclious, these represent gaps of 3.3 million tonnes and 7 million tonnes
tbr 2000 and 2010. respectively. Nevertheless, the GDP elasticity of primary
energy (as distincl froln the final delnand elasticities calculated in earlier
sections) uscd by Ihe Department is aclually higher than that implied by our
[Ol’CCaSls: 0.5 COlnparcd to 0.41. The inaill difference between the projections is
the cconolnic growth assumptions that tmderlie theln. The Department of tile
x 13cpartment of the I]llVJl-Olllllt~lll (1993).
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Environment assume growth of approximately 4 per cent per annum, whereas tile
Medium-Term Review forecasts are for a gro‘,vth rate of almost 5. I per cent.
Figure 4. t: Index of Projected Growth in GDP. TPER9 and C02 Emissions
(1990=100)
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Tile 5.1 per cent Central Forecast for G DP growth from 1997 to 2010 given
in tile A4edium-Term Review ’,’,’as placed however within possible upper and
lower bounds of 6 per cent per annum and 3.5 per cent per annum, respectively.
Diffcrent growth assumptions produce correspondingly different implications for
energy and emissions. "Fable 4. I below sho‘,‘,,s ‘,vhat the effects of these scenarios
would be for Ihe fossil Fuel component of total primary energy requirement
(TPER) and carbon dioxide emissions.
Total primary energy requirement could be as low as 14. I million TOE or as
high as 17 million TOE by 2010. Similarly, emissions of carbon dioxide may not
reach 44 million tonnes in 2010 or could top 50 million tonnes- some 3 million
tonnes higher than the Central Forecast - depending on the rate of growth in the
economy. However, ahhough it is possible that energy and emissions may fall
any’,vhere within these bounds, the Central Forecast of 5.1 per cent average
growth per anllUlU in GDP, with its associated projections for energy and
emissions, remains in our view the most likely outconle in a "no policy change"
environment.
’~ Fossil fuel component only.
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"fable 4.1: TPER and COe Emissions h7 2010 under Alternative GDP Growth
A.~sumptions
Lower Bound Central Forecast Upper Bound
(3.5% p.a.) O.l% p.o.) (6% p,cl.)
TPER (thousand "FOE)
% chcmge all 1990
14,119 15,749 16,933
54% 71% 84%
CO2 Emissions (ktonnes) 43,372 47,467 50,539
~’ a,hich." Power Gen. 16,456 18. 479 19, 798
Road 7)’an.~7~ort 9, 370 10, 528 I 1, 725
Other Final 16.397 I Z229 17, 738
% change on 1990 40% 53% 63%
4.3 International Cotttpttrisotts
The European Commission has produced energy proiections for all fifteen
EU member states as ~cll as the Umted States and Japan. Ihese "eonventioaal
wisdom" scenarios, as they are called, are reproduced in detail in Table 4.2
below. As well as il~cluding energy, they also sl~o:v et~ergy requirement per
capita and the energy intensity orGDP. I:’or comparison also shown are the 1994
data [br Ireland, and our projections (including the possible high and low growth
scenarios discussed above) and those of the Department of the Environment
(DOE).II
The "conventional wisdom" scenario for Ireland is considerably lower than
even the Depariment of Ibe Environment’s figures, with a projection of 12.9
million "fOE in 2010. Again however their forecast for GDP implies an average
annual growth rate of only 3.3 per cent over the period, almost two percentage
points lower than our prqiections. In fact, the energy intensity of GDP that this
scenario implies is actually higher than that implied by our forecasts, namely
0.18 kilograms of oil equivalent per ECU compared to 0.15. Figure 4.2, below,
illustrates these points quite well. It shoves a scatter plot of values for projected
energy consumption per capita and projected GDP per capita for various
cotmtrics taken from Table 4.2, above. As one would expect, there is a definite
posilive relationship be{ween income and energy consumption. Although the
i,, European Carom ission Directorate General for Energy (DG XVII) (I 996).
H Note that bolh the Departn’icnt of the I.~nvironment and the European Cornmission
include renev,,ablc energy sources in their forecasts Ibr TPER, although in neither case is
their share large enough to distort significantly comparisons with our forecasts.
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Table 4.2: Projections for Energy 2010
GDP TPER TPER/cap.
(bn. 1994 ECU) 011. TOE) (TOE)
TPER/GDP
(kgOE/ECU)
IRL 1994 44 10.5 2.93 0.24
ESRI 5.1% 102 15.8 4.12 0.15
ESRI 3.5% 82 14. l 4.03 0.17
ESRI 6% 115 16.9 4.21 0.15
DoE 90 14.5 4.04 0.16
"’Conventional Wisdom" Projections
Ireland 73 12.9 3.60 0.18
EUI5 9,183 1,571.5 4.10 0.17
Belgium 269 54.7 5.47 0.20
Delunark 178 23.8 4.50 0.13
Germany 2,637 380.9 4.56 0.14
Greece 122 28.7 2.68 0.24
Spain 626 I 13.8 2.80 0.18
I:’rance 1,674 281.4 4.52 0.17
Ira ly 1,222 192.0 3.32 0.16
The Nedlerlands 407 77.4 4.69 0.19
Austria 245 30.5 3.72 0.12
Portugal I 19 26.9 2.84 0.23
Finland 131 37.8 7.12 0.29
Sweden 226 48.1 5.29 0.2 I
UK 1.236 258.8 4.30 0.2 I
USA 8,023 2,344.0 7.81 0.29
.lapan 5,933 535.0 4. I I 0.09
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figures produced by the ESRI, the Deparlment of the Eavironment and the
European Commission all differ substantially, none are out of line
internationally. It is not the energy intensity of our growtb which is expected to
be unusual, but rather the rate of growth itself
F igu re 4.2: Energy pet" C’opita and Economic Growth Projections 2010
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The story is a similar one for carbon dioxide emissions. Table 4.3 gives the
"conventional wisdom" projections as well as our Forecasts and those of the
Department of the Environment. Like the previous table, figures are given for
emissions per head and the CO2 intensity of GDP. Also listed are aggregate
emission factors for the various countries and scenarios (total CO2 emissions
divided by total primary eaergy requirement).
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Table 4.3: Pro/ections for COg Emissions 2010
C02 CO2 per COJGD Emission
Emissions capita P k~tctor
Onillion (tonnes) (kg/ECU) (tonnes/TOE)
IOIllles)
IRL 1994
ESRI 5.1%
ESR[ 3.5%
ESRI 6%
DoE
Ireland
EUt5
Belgimn
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
The Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
UK
USA
Japan
34 9. 66 O. 79 3.30
47 12.42 0.47 3.0 I
43 12.39 0.53 3.07
51 12.56 0.44 2.98
41 I 1.35 0.45 2.82
"’Conventional Wisdom "’ Projections
36 10.06 0.49 2.79
3,457 9.03 0.38 2.20
I II I 1.10 0.41 2.03
58 10.94 0.33 2.43
972 I 1.63 0.37 2.55
89 8.32 0.73 3.10
251 6.18 0.40 2.20
393 6.32 0.23 1.40
461 7.98 0.38 2.40
169 10.24 0.41 2.18
64 7.80 0.26 2.10
64 6.74 0.54 2.38
74 13.96 0.57 1.96
96 10.55 0.42 2.00
611 10.15 0.49 2.36
6,007 20.01 0.75 2.56
1,405 10.78 0.24 2.63
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The differing growth assumptions are reflected ill the emissions’ projections.
The conventional wisdom scenario forecasts an increase of barely 2 million
tonnes on tile 1994 figures, the Department of tile Environment 7 million, and
we forecast an increase of 13 million tonnes. Note however how similar the
implications of all three forecasts are for the CO2 intensity of GDP: a range of
0.45-0.49 tonnes per ECU, with the Commission’s figure actually being the
highest. Looking at Figure 4.3, which repeats the scatter plot of Figure 4.2 but
replacing energy consumption per head with emissions per head, this CO2
intensity is not significantly out of line with the international trend.
However, Ireland’s position from an emissions point of view is considerably
worse than that for energy. Returning to Table 4.2, our aggregate emission
factor, although expected to fall from 3.3 tonnes of carbon dioxide per TOE to
approximately 3.0 tonnes per TOE, principally because of fuel switching to gas,
is still considerably higher than most other European countries. A significant
reliance on nuclear energy as well as increased penetration by renewable energy
sources built in to the Conmlission’s projections for many countries explain this
quite well. This is one indicator of the difficulty Ireland may have in meeting
any given emissions target.
Figure 4.3: Per Cell)ira C02 Emissions and Economic Growth - Projections for
2010
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Chapter 5
CARBON DIOXIDE ABATEMENT COSTS
5.1 Introduction
Although a specific target for CO2 emissions has not been set out in the EU
proposals, the large increase in emissions we are forecasting suggests that we
will need to reduce them significantly. Exactly what reduction is necessary will
depend on emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, the other two principal
greenhouse gases. We do not develop detailed forecasts for these gases in this
paper but those estimated by Ihe Department of the Environment (1997a) are
reproduced in Table 5.1, below, along with our projections for carbon dioxide
emissions. The figures for methane and nitrous oxide are expressed in a CO2
equivalent basis, i.e., the amounl of carbon dioxide that would have the same
global-warming effect as lhal caused by emissions of each gas.
Table 5.1: Forec~L~’t Enlissions of Greenhouse Gases on C02-Equivalent Basis
(thousand 7bnne,~)
Gas 1990 2010 Change on 1990
Carbon Dioxide 31.029 47,467 53.0%
Methane 17.038 17,623 3.4%
Nitrous Oxide 9.105 8,082 - I 1.2%
Total (CO2 Equ ivalenl) 57.172 73.172 28.0%
2{110 TtJrget 65, 749 15.0%
Although we Ibrecasl a 53 per cent increase in carbon dioxide emissions
over the period, low growth in projected methane emissions and a reduction in
Ihose of nitrous oxide mean that emissions of all greenhouse gases are only
expected to increase by 28 per cent. By 2010 we are forecast to be emitting just
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over 73 million tonnes of greenhouse gases on a CO2 equivalent basis. The +15
per cent target l’or Ireland agreed by the EU is equivalemt to 65.7 million tonnes
per year by 2010, meaning that a reduction of just over 7.4 million tonnes would
be necessary, assuming that our forecasts for carbon dioxide and those of the
DEpartment of the Environment for methane and ni,trous oxide are correct.
Ideally oue would like to develop a schedule of abatement measures for all gaSES
and for all SEctors of the economy, but the lack of concrete information forces us
to concentrate on reductions in carbon dioxide, in the electricity sector in
particular. The measures outlined in this chapter thus give an indicative upper
bound of the cost of ineeting the target, for it is undoubtedly true that there is
scope for reductions - probably at a lower cost to the economy - in the sectors
and gases not dealt with here. The economic instruments which may be used to
implement these and other ineasures are examined in the next chapter.
5. 2 Demand-Side Measures
Demand-side measures focus principally on get,ring end-users ’to use less
energy, both by reducing their requirement for energy and increasing the
efficiency with which they use this energy. In terms of electricity consumption,
Ibis analysis is most usefully broken down into three categories of end-user:
residential, commercial and industrial. UnfortunatEly, little work has been
completed on possible energy savings in the industrial sector, especially on the
possible penetration of combined-heat-and-power units, the principal means of
Table 5.2: Domestic IZnerg3~ Conservation Measures
Item Annual CO2 Cost per No. of Total CO2 Total
Cost (£) Avoided~Item Tonne Items Avoided Cost (£m)
(tonneau) Avoided (£) (thousand) (ktonnes)
Low-Energy -14.0 0.23 -60.8 500 115 -7.0
Light Bulbs
Lagging Jackets -54.0 0.34 -157.1 300 103 -16.2
Draught Proofing -53.4 0.63 -84.7 400 252 -21.4
Attic Insulation -90.0 1.06 -84.7 200 213 - 18.0
Total
-91.6 683 -62.6
Source: Adapted from Soon (1993).
conservation in this area. However, given our comparative lack of heavy
industry, the scope ibr increased penetration is likely to be considerably less than
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in other European countries. As a result, we concentrate here on the residential
and commercial sectors.
Several studies have been undertaken to examine the level of uptake of
energy conservation measures ill the home, most notably by Scott (1993). She
looked at a number of energy conservation items, lagging jackets, attic
insulation, draught proofing, and low-energy light bulbs, which were the most
significant in terms of energy conservation. From her figures (shown in Table
5.2, above) it is possible to project what reduction in emissions would follow
from a reasonable uptake of all these measures in the present housing stock.
Ireland should be better placed than most countries to achieve high growth in
penetration in these areas since we are starting from a relatively low base and
also because we have a higher owner-occupancy rate, making it more
worthwhile tbr individuals to invest in home improvements. In addition, the
predicted large growth in the housing stock shotdd make it easier for these
measures to be put in place in new homes. This analysis suggests that the
emission of over 600,000 tonnes of CO2 can be avoided simply through the
installation of these four measures in the existing housing stock, all of which
would save money for the hotlseholds affected.
So why haven’t these opportunities been exploited already? There must be
certain bidden costs involved in these measures. Scott’s survey suggests that lack
of inlbrmation represents the greatest barrier to increased energy conservation in
the home. This points to an enhanced role for regulatory and advisory bodies in
this area. Unforttmately, even if there is a large take-up on these measures, it is
likely that some of the savings will go, not on reducing eaergy usage, but on
increasing comfort. In addition, as the residential fuel-mix changes towards
cleaner and more efficient fuels such as gas and electricity, the effect of an extra
TOE saved will have a diminishing effect on emissions.
Relatively little work has been undertaken in examining possible savings in
the commercial sector. Lawlor (1995) looked at a number of schemes in Ireland
and in other European cotmtries, in particular a pilot project carried out by the
Department of’fransport. Energy and Communications during 1990 and 1991.
This project involved an energy audit of several large modern office buildings
and implementation of the findings. The results were annual savings of £4,100
and a reduction of 360 tonnes of CO2 released into the atmosphere. If one
extrapolates these findings across the entire stock of existing office,space
(estimated as 2.8 rail o 1 n-) le bllowing potential savings are possible"l"
~2 This is calculated by scalir, g up estimatcs provided by Sherry Fitz Gerald for the
Dublir~ area.
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Table 5.3: Commercial Energy Conservation Measures
Energy Cost (£) C02 Avoided Cost per tonne
Saved (TOE) (tonnes) A voided (£)
per 100 m2 0.27 -31.54 2.77 -I 1.39
Total Existing 7504
-879,007
Office Space
Source: Adapted from Lawlor (1995).
77,181 -11.39
Many of tile same caveats that apply in the domestic sector apply here too.
As efficiency increases it is likely that some of the gains will be captured by
increased cmnfort - the consumer surplus effect - rather than a reduction in the
amount of energy consmned. Also, as the fuel-mix shifts over time towards those
which are less polluting, tbe beneficial effects (in terms of carbon dioxide
emissions) of an extra unit of energy saved diminish. In any case the total
savings in terms of carbon dioxide emissions merely from the domestic and
commercial conservation methods outlined amount to barely 750,000 tonnes
annually, a reduction of less than 2.5 per cent of 1995 emissions. While there is
undoubtedly considerable scope for more radical reductions on the demand-side,
particularly in the transport sector, much of the CO2 reduction must therefore
come from the supply-side.
5.3 Supply-Side Measures
Fuel-switching represents the most significant supply-side measure available
to the electricity sector. If generating capacity is switched to fuels with higher
efficiency or lower emission factors, significant improvements in emissions can
be realised. Possible fuels include natural gas, which has a lower emission factor
than other fossil fiJels; biomass, the conversion of organic material into
electricity with no release oFCO2; wind power; and nuclear power.
Combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) can convert to electricity up to 55 per
cent of the energy released by the gas they burn, while releasing less carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere. This is considerably more efficient than present-day
plant, and they can do this at a competitive long-run rnarginal cost of
approximately 2.5p/kWh for base-load electricity. By comparison, the other
principal supply-side option, generation by biomass, can cost up to 9p/kWh,
ahhough technical progress is gradually reducing the cost. Wind power may
operate at trader 4p/kWh, but the scope for large-scale wind generation in the
near future is limited, and nuclear power, ahhough less expensive than biomass
and also carbon-free, carries with it other major environmental problems. The
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replacement of present generating capacity with combined-cycle plant
represents, theretbre, the primary method of reducing emissions in electricity¯
On the basis of the latest generation and emissions figures, the cost of switching
present generating capacity to gas is given in Table 5.4 for each plant type.
Table 5.4: Costs of Switching to Combined-Cycle Gas Plants
Plant Hectricity Old Technolog~ CCGT Cost of Switching
7~vpe Generated /hmual    COs Annual    CO2 Annual CO2 avoided Cost
000 7Z)E) Cost (£n0 (ktonne,~ Cost (£n0 (ktonne~9 Cost (£m) (ktonnes) (£/tonne)
Gas/Oil 550 146.2 3041 159.9 2528 13.8 514 26.8
Oil 205 58.7 1714 59.7 943 1.0 770 1.3
Coal 599 118.8 5087 174.1 2752 55.3 3236 17.1
Turf 184 100.8 2956 53.6 847
-47.2 2109 -22.4
Tolal 1,539    424.4 13.698 447.3 7,070    22.9     6,628     3.5
The costs shown are economic costs rather than the costs that necessarily
accrue to the ESB - depreciation on old plant has been ignored and excise taxes
have been deducted where they apply. Local property taxes should be the same
under both systems and are assumed to cancel each other out. As one would
expect, the replacement of turf-fired plant represents the cheapest option and
indeed would result in a saving of ahnost £50m ammally due to the age of the
plant and the high emission factor of the fuel. The cost is very low for oil for
similar reasons. In contrast, replacement of the Moneypoint coal plant would be
considerably more expensive, since it is relatively new and operates near peak
capacity. It would however reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 3.2 million
¯ ¯ 13Ionnes animally - ahnost a quarter of present ESB enllSSlOnS. The replacement
of gas plant is the most expensive per tonne avoided, as these plants are already
relatively environmentally friendly.
At first glance, a reduction of over 6.6 million tonnes of carbon dioxide is
possible from the electricity sector at the relatively low marginal cost of £3.50
per tonne. Such a large-scale conversion to combined-cycle gas raises issues of
both capacity and security, however. Although it is possible that the present
pipeline to Scotland could accommodate an increase in gas throughput of up to
40 per cent. it still would not be able to cope with this regime. In any case,
carrying the entire fuel requirements of the electricity industry through one
13 h would also have uncillaly environnlental benefits, particularly in lowering emissions
of sulphur dioxide, which, ahhough not a greenhouse gas, causes acid rain.
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pipeline would be extremely insecure. As soon as one gets rid of all other
methods of generating electricity, one probably should have a second pipeline to
carry gasl4to ensure, security of supply, no matter how httle" electricity is                                  ¯
produced. Tlus could cost up to £500 million and would therefore have a major
effect on the abatement costs of switching to gas. Assuming that the cost of the
pipeline is written off by 2010, this would represent a 5 per cent increase on
1995 electricity prices, before depreciation, if all the costs of switching to CCGT
are passed on to the consumer.15
5.4 CO,-A batement Cost Curves
We are now in a position to build up a marginal-cost schedule for abatement
measures. This is displayed in Table 5.5 below, along with the corresponding
items from a cost schedule for Denmark developed by Morthorst (1994).
Table 5.5: CO,Abatement Marginal Cost Schedule for Ireland with Comparable Items for Denmark
Measure Ireland Denmark
Marginal CO2 avoided as % of 2005 Cumulative Marginol as % of 2005
Cost £1"tonne (ktonne$) Emissions CO2 Avoided Cost £/tomle I£missions
I:)om. I:.nergy -91.6 663 1.6% 663 -45 1.5%
Conservalion
CCGT Ibr Turf -22.4 2.108 5.0% 2.77 I
Comm. Energy -I 1.4 77 0.2% 2.848 -40 2.5%
Conservation
CCGT Ibr Oil 1.3 770 1.8% 3.618 ]
CCGT tbr Coal* 24.8 3.236 7.6*/’0 6.854 -3 1.25"/o
CC(;T lbr Gas 26.7 514 1.2% 7.368 J
Wind I~r CCGT 31(.0 230 0.5% 7.598 2 1.75%
Itit~mass Ibr 152.6 13979 33.0% 21577 0 5%
CCGT
" includes cosl of second pipeline.
Source: Adapted from Morthorst (1994).
~4 This assumes of course that the only security measure possible under such a scenario is
a second pipeline. Security of electricity supply could be maintained by other methods,
such as maintaining Moneypoint or building up a stock of liquefied natural gas (LNG). If
these options proved better, then it would be capacity considerations alone that would
drive the introduction of the second pipeline.
~ A 2.5 per cent increase is required to price at the long-run marginal cost of switching to
CCGT. An additional 2.5 per cent comes from dividing the cost of the pipeline by total
revenue from electricity generation out to 2010.
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Irish figures are expressed as percentages of projected 2005 emissions to
enable comparison with tile Danish measures. Two additional items are included
tbr Ireland: first, an expansion of wind generation of 50,000 TOE and, second, a
scenario where all growth in electricity generation comes not from gas, as we
have assumed so far, but from biomass. In both cases the marginal costs
represent the opportunity costs of not building extra CCGT plant. Note also that
the cost of switching from coal to gas includes the cost of the second pipeline,
since at that point ,all electricity would be generated by gas and the pipeline
would be needed to ensure security of supply. A corollary of this is that the cost
of the second pipeline is subtracted from tbe cost of switching to biomass, since
by switching to biomass rather than to gas, a second pipeline would not have to
be built.
Domestic conservation reduces emissions by a similar proportion in both
countries, but at a lower cost (higher benefit) in Ireland. This is what one would
expect considering the lower level of penetration of such measures here. Costs
for CCGT are rougbly similar, but tbere is considerably more scope for
reductions in emissions in Ireland. In fact the bulk of the carbon dioxide
reduction in Denmark comes from items wbich do not appear in the Irish
schedule (principally because of a lack of information), particularly tile
expansion of combined I~eat-and-power units (CHP) in industry and connection
to an already extensive district heating network.
I~’rom these schedules it is possible to construct both marginal and average-
cost curves for CO., reduction in Ireland and in Denmark. These are shown in
Eigures 14 and 15 below.
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Figure 5. I: Marginol Cost Curves for COe Reduction in Ireland and Denmark
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Figure 5.2: Average Cost Curves for C02 Reduction in lreland and Denmark
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As one caa see from the average cost curves (Figure 5.2), the cost of
reducing up to 12 million touncs of CO2 using the measures listed would be
lower in Denmark than it would be in Ireland. As a result, it is likely that the
impact of any specific target for carbon dioxide would be considerably greater in
¯ 16 , .
Ireland than In Denmark. Having sa*d that, it may be possible to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions by over eight million tonnes without any net cost to the
economy, although any further reductions using the methods outlined would be
very expensive. However this analysis ignores the demand-side effects of such
measures, especially those caused by the construction of a second gas pipeline,
and it is Io these that we turn no’,’,’.
5.$ Demand-Side Effects
We have assumed for a 5 per cent increase in the price of electricity to
consumers to offset the costs of introducing combined-cycle gas technology on a
large scale and building a second pipeline. This price increase would in itself
affect the behaviour of agents in the economy, perhaps leading them 1o switch
away from electricity towards the dirtier fuels or to generate their own
electricity. In both cases there would be a loss in end-use efficiency and an
increase in emissions. To avoid this, the price increase would have to be applied
to all fuels used in non-transport final consumption (the transport sector’s
isolation would mean that no price increase would be necessary - although it
may be desirable - for petrol and diesel).17 This would raise the cost of energy to
everyone, and would furlhcr reduce the primary energy requirement, and thus
emissions, compared to the do-nothing scenario. The projected effects of such a
measure on the national emissions are displayed in Table 5.6 on the basis of an
own-price elasticity of demand for energy of-0.35.
"Were quotas to be made tradable, there would be scope for trade in emission rights
between Ireland and Denmark. with beneI]cial results for both panics, compared to the
situation where quotas arc non-traded. This is discussed in the conclusion.
17 There is an argument for putting a disproportionate amount of the burden on the dirtier
fuels, coal and turf but we do not consider this option in our analysis.
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"Fable 5.6: CO2 Emissions for a Complete Switch to CCGT with an Accompanying 5 per
cent Increase in the Price of All Non-Transport Fuels 1990-2010 (thousand
Ionnes~la¢
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Coal 7,800 7,488 6,689 944 433
Turf 6,118 5,418 2,412 2,239 2,079
Oil 12,396 15,958 16,433 18,453 20,768
LPG 395 395 378 369 360
Gas 4,319 5,552 9,032 13,977 16,721
Total 31,029 34,81 I 34,945 35,981 40,36 I
% increase on 1990 12.2% 12.6% 16.0% 30. I%
Share Contributed by 34.2% 37.0% 32.2% 28.1% 28.9%
Electricity Sector (%)
Total CO, enlissions in such a scenario could be 40.3 million tonnes by
2010, a reduction compared to the baseline scenario of 7. I million tonnes. When
one factors in the conservation measures listed in "Fable 5.5, this figure rises to
7.8 million tonnes, giving projected total emissions in 2010 if there is a complete
switch to generation by CCGT of just over 39.6 million tonnes. This represents a
27 per cent increase in carbon dioxide emissions and, crucially, a 14.3 per cent
increase in emissions of all greel~house gases. In other words, if our forecasts for
CO2 and those of tile Department of tile Environment for methane and nitrous
oxide are accurate, and if we have correctly estimated the costs of converting to
combined-cycle gas, it may be possible to meet our emissions target at little or
no net cost to tile econonly.
This is a risky strategy, however. If we have underestimated the growth in
the economy or the level of fuel-switching in other sectors, it may be the case
that further reductions in carbon dioxide might be required from the electricity
sector. In any case, there are Further, unquantifiable risks in a wholesale switch
to gas generation. We may leave ourselves open to buying gas from a relatively
small number of suppliers who effectively have monopoly powers and may be in
a position to exploit them. Under these conditions, we would have to relax our
~ It is assumed that the conversion is done on a phased basis - peat then oil then coal
then gas - so that all existing plant is replaced by 2010, but the order of conversion is
essentially arbitrary, since for this analysis only the 2010 emissions are of importance.
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assumption that all marginal production is generated using combined-cycle gas,
and instead, in the interests of security of supply, consider a conversion to
biomass. As one can see ~roln the cost curve in Figure 5.1, the marginal costs
rise rapidly under such a scenario. This would involve a large increase in prices
Ihat would have to be applied to all energy sources to prevent agents switching
away from electricity towards the dirtier fuels. As an illustration, shown in Table
5.7 is the least expensive biomass option: COlwersion of all present coal, oil and
gas generating capacity to CCGT and conversion of the turf stations to biomass.
The result would be a reghne where only l0 per cent of electricity production
would be generated by biomass and tile rest by CCGT, and yet if one were to
price at long-run marginal cost, this would require a 56 per cent increase in
energy prices.19
Table 5.7:C’O2 Emissions fi)r a Switch to Generation by 90 per cent CCGT and
10 per cent Biomass with an Accompanying 56 per cent hTcrease in
the Prices of Non-Transport Fuels 1990-2010 (thousand tonnes)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Coal 7,800 7,488 5,364 584 354
Turf 6,118 5,418 4,748 4,606 1,701
Oil 12,396 15,958 14,671 16,836 18,945
LPG 395 395 310 302 294
Gas 4,319 5,552 7,390 I 1,156 13,077
Total 31,029 34,811 32,482 33,484 34,372
Change on 1990 12.2% 4. 7% 7.9% 10.8%
Share Contributed by 34.2% 37.0% 35.0% 30.9% 25. I%
Electricity Sector
At this point, most of the additional reduction ia emissions would be coming
not from fuel switching to biomass, but from the demand effects of the price
increase needed to pay for it. With the marginal cost of electricity generation
rising so steeply in the meantime, generating companies would earn huge profits,
especially those with tile right to burn gas. In truth, this scenario is not really a
. .             .
A second plpehne v,,ould std] be required under this scenario. The cost of this has been
buih in to this 56 per cent price rise.
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supply-slde measure at all, but rather a misapplied carbon tax with a
considerable portion of the revenues going to generating companies. Were the
electricity sector to bear most of the brunt of the redaction, it might only be
through such drastic measures that lower targets would be attainable, and it is
most likely that these would involve ancillary costs which we have not
¯ . 20investigated.
These points explain in large part why the average-cost curve for Ireland is
so much higher than that for Denmark (Figure 5.2). The Danish schedule
contains a number of items from a number of sectors which it may be possible to
incorporate into the Irish schedule, such as increased conservalion in industry
and services, or even district heating. Further research is therefore required to fill
in the gaps in our knowledge. Otherwise anything other than stringent
application of the measures outlined above could leave us in a very precarious
situation.
This chapter has outlined a number of possible abatement measures focusing
in particular on carbon dioxide reduction in the electricity industry. It is by no
means an exhaustive list but provides a useful indication of the cost of meeting a
specific emissions targets Exactly what mechanisms should be used to ensure
that these - or other - abatement measures are implemented will be examined in
the next chapter.
.,o In particular, such a large increase in energy prices would have detrimental effects on
economic growth, and thus produce even lower emissions.
Chapter 6
POLIC Y RESPONSE
Current projections suggest that emissions in the EU as a whole will overrun
the target set as part of the EU negotiating position for the Kyoto conference
(Commission of the European Communities, 1997). The evidence presented in
Chapter 3 for Ireland suggests tbat domestic emissions are also likely to greatly
exceed the proposed Irish limit for greenhouse gases by 2010. These baseline
forecasts point to the need for policy changes at both an EU level and within
individual economies, including Ireland, in order to meet the target values.
If the reduction in emissions were small the choice of policies to achieve it
would probably not be very important. However, tbe reduction which is likely to
be needed will be quite substantial and the correct choice of instrument could
have a significant impact on future economic growth. This chapter considers the
range of policy measures available, at both the level of the EU and the domestic
economy, and what mix of instrunlents is likely to ensure that emissions targets
are met at a minimum economic cost. Underlying the approach the discussion is
the basic principle that the polluter should pay for the damage caused by his or
her pollution.
The design of fiscal hlstruments for efficiently implementing environmental
policy is easiest where the location or concentration of pollution is not a concern
of policy (McKay, Pearson, and Smith, 1990). For example, the use of simple
national taxes to control pollution of a particular river would be wbolly
inappropriate; the same effect could be arrived at much more efficiently by legal
remedies. In tbe case of global warming, where emissions - wherever they occur
on tbe globe - affect tbe environment equally, fiscal instruments (taxes or
quantitative restrictions - quotas) are the most efficient instrument.
The two main types of instruments considered here are quantitative
restrictions and taxes on emissions. Within the broad class of quantlty
restrictions there are a further set of possibilities ranging from the case where
emissions quotas for individuals (or countries) are immutable to the case where
they are auctioned off to the highest bidder. There are also a wide range of other
instruments, such as investment incentives for research and development, which
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may play a subsidiary role in implementing policy. However, on their own, these
subsidiary instrunlents can not be expected to produce the major change in
behaviour which is needed.
Taxation and quantity restrictions have different characteristics as
instruments for implementing environmental objectives. The choice between
thenl will depend on tile precise uature of the problem to be tackled and the
circumstances in which a solution must be found. The instruments differ in how
effective they are in achieving tile environmental objective; how efficiently a
given target is met where efficiency is defined in terms of the value of lost
output; in their effects on tile dislribution of resources within economies. In the
case of tile problem of excessive greenhouse gas emissions, as discussed below,
our broad conclusion is that taxes are better suited to tile task in hand than
quantitative restrictions. While under certain circumstances quotas may be more
effective at meeting a precise envirotmlental objective, taxes (or tradable quotas)
are likely to be nlore economically efficient.
Tile adavantage of quantitive restrictions is that, if they are enforced, they
can better ensure that a target level of emissions is met on an appointed date;
they are more effective at meeting the environmental objective producing the
improvement in welfare which the abatement implies. Taxes, by contrast are a
less accurate instrument for hitting a precise target because because of
uncertainty about the response of tile demand for energy to changes in prices so
that it may take time to discover the appropriate level of taxes on pollution. This
is clearly a disadvantage if emission limits nlust be reached instantaneously.
However, tile time scale of the global warming problem is such that there is time
for econolnic experimentation with taxes to find their appropriate level. It is not
like tile case of, for example, plutonium elnissions, where there is no safe level
and a zero qtmntity restriction on elniSsions should be binding. It should be
possible to reach any particular target using taxes with a limited degree of
experimentation.
The second major issue concerning the choice of policy instruments relates
to their impact on economic efficiency; which instrument implements a given
emissions target with least cost in terms of tbrgone output? Every restriction on
production or eonsulnption, if it is to have any effect, will impose a cost. Tile
disadvantage of a regulatory approach involving national or individual non-
tradable quotas, is that tile choice of quota is essentially arbitrary. The same
quota per head or per unit of GNP 0he EU proposals are for absolute quotas,
unrelated to population or GNP) may impose very different costs on different
countries or individuals whereas a tax imposes an equal cost oil all polluters. For
example, carbon-dioxide quotas (based on population or GNP) might impose no
costs on a cotmtry with ample supplies of hydro-electricity but they could
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impose very heavy costs on another country which had a different structure of
natural resources or of productive capacity. Tile differences in cost ,,viii reflect
the magnitude of the problems caused by the restriction for the different
individuals. For large changes in emissions they could significantly alter the
competitiveness of individual countries or individual firms leading to a
relocation of production and employment.2~ This relocation would be inherently
wasteful as world emissions would be unchanged but economies would have had
to pay for the significant costs of relocation. Thus unless the initial allocation of
quotas is informed with the wisdom of Solomon they will give rise to an
uneeessary loss of output !
The alternative mechanism, a lax, imposes an equal cost (per unit of
pollution) on all those who have to PaY it and the value of the right to pollute
accrues to the state in tax revenue. As a result, it would not distort the underlying
competitiveness of individual companies or countries within the EU; those who
could easiest reduce their emissions wotdd do so while those for whom it would
be very difficult and expensive would continue with some lower level of
emissions. One possibility is that individuals faced with a regulatory
environment could be allowed to do deals on the side suell that tile total pollution
was held constant (at the regulated lower level); individuals or countries for
wl~om the restriction was severe would "get together with" individuals for whom
it was not; utoney would change hands, and the quotas would be readjusted so
that they imposed equal costs on the individuals concerned. This is the process
which takes place when quotas are made tradable - can be bought and sold on an
open market. Clearly, if carried to its logical conclusion people would continue
to trade quotas until the costs (taxes) were identical for all affected parties and
the emissions target would be met with a minimum cost in terms of output
forgone.
There are two additional considerations in choosing between taxes and
different kinds of quota regimes. First, the decision on the appropriate initial
quota lot each individual (or country) has major potential implications for the
efficiency of the tax system and the distribution of income. Second, the cost of
running such a system and the costs of operating such a market would probably
be greater than the costs involved in imposing a tax of the same amount.
If quotas are allocated to individnals or states rather than auctioned to the
highest bidder the value of the right to pollute accrues to those granted the quota.
On the other haled, if the quota is auctioned or taxes are used the revenue accrues
to the state. This difference is important, as the use to which the additional
revenue is put by government potentially has a nlajor effect on the overall
21 Note that poorer countries argue that while it may be inefficient on a global scale, the
redistribution effects could be beneficial.
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economic impact of tile regulation of emissions. If tile revenue is used to reduce
other distonionary taxes this can significandy reduce the overall economic cost
of the environmental restrictions. Where the benefit of tile quota is left with the
polluter (as a quota) there is no possibility for such a reform of the tax system.
When there is only one polluter there are no income distribution implications
to decisions on emission quotas. In this case the regulatory and tile tax
approaches will have identical effects on the allocation of resources for an
identical reduction in emissions. However, where there are a number of
individuals or economic agents granting a large quota, which can be traded, to an
individual ,,vho will have little difficulty restricting emissions is equivalent to a
transfer of resources to that individual (tile likely proceeds oil the sale of the
unused quota). The opposite is the case ’,’,,here the quota is very restrictive on an
individual. Because of uucenainty about how quotas would affect each
individual, the full income distribution implications of the regulatory approach
will be uncertain.
If the value of the right to pollute (the value of the quota or the proceeds of a
lax) accrues to the slate22 and is used to remove other distorting forms of
taxation this will go a significant way to offsetting the undesirable economic
costs of the restrictions on pollution. Recent research (Parry, Williams and
Goulder. 1997) highlights this issue (of who receives the revenue in return for
the right to emit greenhouse gases) as beiug very significant in determining the
ultimate cost of restrictions on emissions of greenhouse gases. This is because of
the considerable poteutial benefit which would accrue from reform of the tax
system using the proceeds of the sale of quotas or of a lax on emissions. In tile
case Of the EU iu general, and Ireland in particular, there is evidence that taxes
on labour are seriously distortionary and that their replacement by taxes on
greenhouse gases would ilnprove the overall fullctioning of the tax system. An
earlier paper by Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) estimated that for Ireland tile
benefits which would accl’ue from using tile revenue from a carbon tax to cut
labour taxes would more than offset the economic costs of the restriction on
pollution.
6.1 EU Policy
At an EU level the current situation is that agreement has been reached oll
the broad outlines of a strategy which will be submitted to the international
conference at Kyoto. This set of proposals represents a negotiating position and
it does not yet have the force of law. The mechanisms whereby tile reduction of
22 Where emissioll rights are auctioned off the proceeds of the sale would accrue to the
EU or Ihc natiortal govcrlmlent.
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15 per cent in EU elnissions would be implelnented have not been agreed in any
detail. There are two aspects to tile ilnplcmentation that have to be agreed among
member states if and when specific targets are accepted for tile EU at Kyoto:
¯ issues concerning tile definition of each country’s target: the extent to
which emissions of the different gases would be substitutable for one
another: the possibility of "joint implementation" whereby some
countries inay get credit for helping other countries to meet agreed
elnission targets: the Ilandling of "sinks" which absorb carbon dioxide in
a harmless manner (forestry); internal trade in energy (electricity); and
¯ tile mechanisnls for implementing tile targets at both tile EU and the
dolnestic level - regulations, taxes, quotas, etc.
The problem faced by the EU is to ilnplelnent a substantial but gradual
reduction in elnissions of greenhonse gases. A wide range of research indicates
that the most desirable econolnic mechanism for implelnenting this objective is
through a common tax throughout the EU on emissions of greenhouse gases. A
second possibility wonld be for tile EU to auction offthe (tradable) rights to emit
grcenhonse gases to Ihe highest bidders. This would ensure that the cost of
polhlting would be similar across cotmtries and that the revenue raised could be
used to reduce other distortionary taxes. However, this could prove
administratively more complex (and more costly) than the tax route. It also
might prove difficult to ilnplelnent where the purehasors of the quotas ,,’,,ere
countries rather than individual producers.
The third mechanism, which seems more likely to ineet with acceptance
within the EU. is tile allocation of national emission quotas which may then be
tradable between countries. This ineehallisln will have the tmfortunate effect that
Ihe prescribed EU elnission target is likely to be inet at greater cost, in terms of
lost I.~U output, dmn if either of the other two inechal~iSlnS were employed.
However, provided that the quotas are tradable betveeen countries the loss of
output may not be huge, While leaving tile EU as a wbole worse off than under
allerlmtive strategies, this policy would result in certain countries being better off
Ihall under the lax or auction route while other countries would be definitely
worse-off. It’ the national quotas were not tradable then the loss of output within
the EU would bc even grcater, and the cost to some (but not necessarily all)
countries would be greater than under a regime of tradable quotas.
To delerlnine who would be the winners and who would be the losers under
such a regilne il would he necessary to have intbrlnation on the costs of
abatenlcnt of emissions Ibr every sector of every EU melnber state, not just for
carbon dioxide in the electricity industry, but for tile three inain gases for each
economy. This highlighls the problems with fixed quotas as opposed to the more
decenlralised iIlechanislns of a coinnlon I,’lx or all auctiOll where tile central
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planner does not have to bave perfect understanding of all EU economies and
perfect foresigbt.
If quotas are to be the means of implementing an EU-wide policy on
controlling greenhouse gases, then it is essential that tile quotas be tradable.
Ideally, the quotas should not be allocated by a decision of’the Council but rather
tbey should be attctioned at periodic intervals. This approach would minimise the
likelihood that tile allocation of quotas would have a lasting impact on the
distribution of income between EU member states.23 If auctioning is not possible
then, at tile very leasL tile quotas, however allocated, should be tradable within
the EU. "File initial grant of a quota would affect tile distribution of income but
the ability to trade the quota would equalise the cost of meeting the target across
EU member states (and potentially across sectors) ensuring that the loss in
output needed to reach the agreed EU target for emissions would be minimised.
Tile agents who are allov,,ed to trade quotas should be the national
governments if they are to be tile authority ’,vldeh implements the quota regime
within national boundaries. If some mixed regime were introduced where some
firms could trade on au EU market but other firms and individuals would be
regulated by national authorities the results could be most unsatisfactory. In the
latter case tile national government would still have responsibility to implement
EU policy domestically, in a sense the quota would belong to the nation, but tbe
government’s decision on tile appropriate way to implement the regime would be
restricted by the bebaviour of individual firms trading on their own account.
F’inally, if the downward adjustment in emissions is to be achieved within
tile EU with a minimum loss of EU output then there should be no exemptions
From the need to take action. All sectors should be treated equally and all
greenhouse gases should be included under tile regime. Any attempt to introduce
special measures witbin tile regime would add to the distortions which it would
cause. If the effect on groups of individuals or households are likely to suffer to
an exceptional extent then it would remain possible for national authorities to
use tile usual channels to alter the distribution of income within their
jurisdiction.
Finally, it will be important to review other aspects of EU policy to ensure
that they do not aggravate tile cost of adjustment within the EU. The most
notable case where a reexamination may be required is tile Common Agricultural
Policy (the CAP). "File possible impact of CAF’ induced distortions on the market
For biomass was examined in Fitz Gerald and Johnston (1995) and it showed
how tile precise nature of tile CAP could affect tile cost of meeting an
environmental objective on using biomass. When the additional issue of the
23 "file share-out of the revenue from tile auction would, however, involve decisions on
the distribution of itlcome between member states.
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direct emissions of greenhouse gases from agriculture is considered it becomes
clear that further analysis of this issue is required within the EU.
6.2 National Policy
The same principles apply to the choice of instruments at a national level as
at the iuternational level: the reduction in emissions would best be achieved
dlrough the introduction of an appropriate tax per unit of greenhouse gas
emitted. The use of tradable quotas, which should be auctioned off, would not be
appropriate where there are a large number of polluters. (For example, if every
inotorlst had to buy an emission quota tile situation would become impossible.)
Any measures introduced to reduce domestic emissions should apply to all
sectors. Any attempt to impose a large part of the burden on a specific sector or
to exempt a particular sector could seriously increase the economic damage
arising from the reduction in elnissions. If, for example, a separate, tight
emission target were set for the electricity industry, raising the cost of electricity
by a large amount, while manufacturing industry was exempt, then
inanufacturing industry would tend to shift away frorn buying electricity to either
using other fuels or generating their own electricity. This could prove to be very
inefficient, in some cases actually increasing emissions. This might be the case if
some fuels fell outside the net for a carbon tax, as in the case of own-account turf
production. In such an eventuality the imposition of a tax on briquettes could
enhance the profitability of own-accouut turf production, resulting in increased
inefficiency of production and possibly higher emissions.
Alternatively the exemption of a particular sector which is a heavy polluter
could also seriously inagnify the cost to tile country. While tile heavy polluter
might survive as a result of its exemption, the cost to other sectors could be
cumulatively much more severe.
As the national quota (or the EU limit) is cast in terms of all greenhouse
gases it will be important that the tax (or tradable quota) should be applied to
emissions of tile three main greenhouse gases, using appropriate weights. Any
altelnpt to exclude the agricultural sector fi’Oln playing its role in abating
greenhouse gas clnissions could be seriously damaglug to Ireland, given that the
agrieuhural sector plays a inuch more importaut role in Irish emissions of
greenhouse gases than m other countries. If the cost of reducing emissions in
agriculture is less than in other sectors, such as electricity, then the exclusion of
this sector could possibly deprive h’eland of simple and cheap~ solutions through
switching the or~enlal~on ol domestic agrtcultural production. Obvtousty if the
cost of change in agriculture were, in fact, high then Ireland might be best served
2.~ Pitz GeraLd and Johnston (1995) would suggest that this may be true for Ireland.
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lhrough the exclusion of agriculture from restrictions on ernissions, though the
EU as a whole would still be disadvantaged by such a policy response. The
uncertainty about this issue highlights the need for further research on the role of
agriculture in combating global warming.
Cbapter 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Z 1 Introduction
The negotiating stance agreed by tile EU for the Kyoto summit on global
warming involves a conunitlnent to reduce the Uuion’s emissions of greenhouse
gases by 15 per cent between 1990 and 2010. As part of this approach Ireland
has accepted a cap on emissions in 2010 of 15 per cent above the 1990 level. As
part of our assessment of the economic implications we first examine what ,,viii
happen to greenhouse gases in Ireland over the period to 2010 on the basis of
current policies. This identifies the magnitude of the problem which Ireland
faces in ineeting the 2010 target.
In considering Ibe cost of reducing emissions by different amounts we
ideally need details of the marginal cost of abatement - the cost of reductions of
dil’fercnt amounts - to allow us identify the direct cost of meeting the target. The
limited nature of the data available only permits all examination of one of the
possible options for policy action - the field of electricity generation. However,
cvidellce from other sources suggests that the transport sector and agriculture
may also be desirable targets for policy change designed to reduce emissions. In
Ibe case of transport, the considerable undesirable environmental effects from
traffic congestion suggest that such action could bring additional benefits to the
community. For agricnhure earlier work suggests that the existiug distortions in
the Common Agricultural Policy and lhe possibility of switching the focus of
output could allow signilicant reductions in emissions at limited cost.
7.2 Emi.~.~’ions Projections
Tile A,ledittm-Term Review provides a comprehensive assessment of likely
prospects for the economy over the period out to 2010. The central forecast in
the Review suggests that between 1990 and 2010 GDP is likely to rise by around
5 per cent a year. This wottld leave tile volume of GDP in 2010 around two and
Ibree quarters times thc level in 1990. On the basis of these economic forecasts
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Chapter 3 suggests that energy demand in 2010 will be around 70 per cent
greater than in 1990.25 While This projected increase in energy consumption is
large by the standards of tile fbreeasts for oilier countries, it must be considered
against the background of the likely very substantial growth in the volume of
GDP and the resulting convergence in living standards to the EU average.
Viewed in this light, tile 20 year period to 2010 is forecast to see a considerable
reduction in tile energy iuteasity of economic activity in Ireland.
The eousumption of energy will continue to be the major source of
emissions of carbon dioxide in ireland over the next 15 years. The analysis in
Chapter 4 suggests that, oil unchanged policies, they ,.viii rise by over 50 per cent
between 1990 and 2010. I f tile Department of the Environment’s projections for
methane and nitrous oxide emissions are accepted, then total emissions of
greenhouse gases in 2010 woukl be 28 per cent above their 1990 level. This
would contrast with the "national objective", agreed by the Department of the
Environment, limiting emissions in 2010 to 15 per cent above the 1990 level.
Our higher forecast is chiefly due to the different assumptions concerning
the rate of growtll in GDP. As discussed in Chapter 5, the forecast of energy
consumption and of enlissions of carbon dioxide per unit of output in 2010 is
well within the range of experience forecast for our EU panners.
Because of the importance of the differences in the projections for GDP
growth over the next 15 years and because of the iuberent uncertainty which
must attach to any such figures we have also examined the effect of varying our
economic assumptions. In all cases the forecast growth in emissions is much
higher than the national objective set by the Department of the Environment.
The likelihood that the CAP will undergo major transformation in the next
decade renders forecasting the likely trend in future emissions from agriculture
very difficult. "(’here is also the possibility of interaction between the forces
driving agricultural emissions and the forces driving tile development of forestry
- tile major potential absorber of carbon dioxide (Fitz Gerald and Johnston,
1995).26
Tbe gap bet,.veen the target for emissions and the likely outturn for 2010
appears to be quite large so tim! the choice of policy instruments needed to
implement tile target will be ilnport;.mt.
.,s In the light of new research, described in this paper, we have revised downwards the
projections published iu the t~ediut~t-Tcrm I?eview for energy demand and greenhouse
~as emissions, The projections |br economic activity are the same as in the Review,
In fac ~ ~s no clear whe her he Depar men of he Enwronment forecasts take accoun
of the fact that the land used in forestry is likely to come from a reduction in land used
for cattle rear~ng. Thus an increase in lbrestry is likely to brirLg the ~dditional bonus of a
reduction in methane emissions from caule rearing.
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7.3 Economic Implications
Because of the absence of satisfactory information for other sectors we
concentrate here first on the costs of limiting emissions in the electricity sector.
In a sense, by concentrating all the adjustment costs on the electricity sector this
provides an upper bound to the possible cost of meeting the 2010 emission
target - the worst case. If the economic costs of reducing emissions are to be
minimised it is essential that all sectors pay the same costs for polluting.
If the 2010 emission target is to be met, on the basis of the forecasts given
above, it will be necessary to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide by 7.4 million
tonnes compared to the "unchanged policy scenario". If it were all to be met
within the electricity sector then its emissions in 2010 would be reduced to 4 per
cent above their 1990 level. The cost would be a real increase in electricity
prices of around 5 per cent. There would also have to be a rise in prices of all
other forms of energy, uot just electricity, to avoid providing inappropriate
incentives to shift consumption away from electricity to other polluting fuels.
This rise in prices would represent a real cost to the economy rather similar
in character (though not in magnitude) to that which occurred as a result of the
1970s oil price crises. However, in this case the cost to the nation would arise
from the need to undertake additioual investment in new generating capacity
using imported capital goods, rather than from a rise in the price of imported
energy. The reduction in emissious in the electricity sector could be achieved by
shifting most, if not all, generation to Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT).
This would have substantial cost implications as it would probably involve
closing all existing solid fuel stations (including Moneypoint and the turf
stations) even though they may not have reached the end of their useful lives by
2010. It could double or treble the new investment needed in generation in
Ireland over the next 15 years as all existing generation plant was replaced.
In addition to the costs involved in the premature closure of existing plant,
the concentration on gas as the fi~el source for almost all electricity generation
would leave Ireland very exposed to disturbances in the gas market in Europe.
There are relatively few potential suppliers of gas to the EU market: the main
sources for the future are likely to be the UK, Norway, Russia and Algeria.
(Much of the Russian supplies of gas to the EU pass through the Ukraine.) This
leaves the EU energy market for gas vulnerable to political instability in Eastern
Europe and Algeria and it increases the danger that such instability could disrupt
the domestic energy market (as it did in the 1970s).
As well as being unduly dependent on a few countries for gas supplies
reliance on a single pipe-line (from Scotland) to supply the whole country also
represents a serious risk. If the country were to become totally dependent on
electricity generated from gas this would clearly be a matter for concern. To
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offset some of these dangers, substantial investment in both gas storage and
strengthening of the gas transmission network (from the UK) would probably be
needed.
While detailed information on sectors other than electricity is not available,
by adopting appropriate fiscal instruments it may well prove possible to meet the
EU target by 2010 without major disruption to economic activity. However, if a
significantly larger contribution to reducing emissions were required from the
electricity sector (than a reduction of 7.4 million tonnes of CO2) the analysis in
Chapter 6 suggests that the costs would rise rapidly. With the exception of wind
power which, for technical reasons, can only provide a limited share of total
generation at the moment, other forms of renewable energy, in particular
biomass, are likely to be very expensive using technology available to-day (or
likely to become available in the immediate future). A shift to biomass as the
marginal fuel would be likely to increase the average cost of electricity to
consumers by over 50 per cent, with a much larger percentage increase for
27industrial users.
Table 7. I : Forecast Growth in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by Sector
(thousand tonnes)
1990 2010 Change
Road Transport 4,896 10,528 115.0°/’o
Power Generation 10,608 18,479 74.2%
Other Final (excluding Electricity) 14,536 17,229 18.5%
Non-Energy 989 1,230 24.4%
Total Carbon Dioxide 31,029 47,467 53.0%
Methane (CO2 Equivalent) 17,038 17,623 3.4%
Nitrous Oxide (CO2 Equivalent) 9,105 8,082 -11.2%
Total Greenhouse Gas 57,172 73,172 28.0%
Target 65,749 15.0%
27 The percentage is higher for industrial users because they currently pay very much less
per unit consumed than the household sector because of economies of scale in
transmission and distribution. The surcharge arising from the need to change generating
capacity would be the same in absolute terms for all consumers, giving rise to the higher
percentage price increase for those consumers currently paying the lowest price.
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Table 7. I shows our forecasts for tile growth in emissions between 1990 and
2010. Even if the electricity industry were to carry all the burden of adjustment it
still seems likely that overall national emissions could be reduced to the current
proposed target without recourse to generating electricity from hiomass.
Provided that the burden of adjustment is borne by all sectors and by emitters of
all three greenhouse gases the national costs will be lower than where electricity
alone carries the burden of adjustment.
The share of emissions attributable directly to the transport sector is rising
and unless that sector is brought within the overall framework of policy to
reduce emissions no long-run solution will be possible. As rising traffic volumes
are imposing increasing costs througil congestion there is a further reason for
considering policy ineasures aimed at that sector. One important policy measure
which must play a role is greatly increased investment in public transport.
However, all the evidence points to the fact that such investment, on its own,
will not be enough and that fiscal measures, such as taxes or charges, must play a
vital role in traffic inanagement in the future.
However, action by Ireland alone will not be nearly as effective as a
common EU-wide (or, even better, OECD-wide) approach. Raising the cost of
energy used in transport in Ireland will provide some incentive to car owners to
use their vehicles less. However, it will not result in a significant increase in
research into energy efficiency in cars. However, if applied at the level of the
EU, then increased research would be profitable and the long-term impact on
energy emissions could be much greater. This highlights the desirability of a co-
ordinated approach at both the level of the EU and the OECD.
The agricultural sector accounts for around 40 per cent of Ireland’s
greenhouse gas elnissions. It is, therefore, vital that it be included in any package
of measures to reduce domestic emissions. Reform of the CAP, through
encouraging less intensive use of fertiliser, will make a contribution to reducing
emissions. However, it is likely that if the environmental implications of
agricuhural production were taken into account in designing the changes in the
CAP regime in the next decade, then a significantly greater reduction might be
achieved. Changes in the relative levels of market support for livestock
production and for forestry and biomass could be important. It may be that
relatively small changes in relative prices, leaving farm incomes largely
unchanged, could well make a significant contribution to reducing emissions.
7. 4 Implications for Electricity Regulation
The effect of new measures to encourage a reduction in emissions by the
electricity sector could have the effect of making existing plant obsolete before
66 THE COSTS TO IRELAND OF GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT
its time and before it is fully depreciated. From an economic point of view the
debt incurred to finance this plant is a sunk cost and electricity should be priced
at the long-run marginal cost of production. However, there will remain the issue
of who should pay for this s’tranded debt. If, as discussed below, there remains
intramarginal plant which is profitable, these profits may be used to pay off the
stranded debt. This issue would not pose a major problem in the event of the
ESB remaining a monopoly producer and supplier of electricity. However, in the
likely event of competition being introduced in generation, the allocation of
these sunk costs would have to be sorted out to avoid distorting the market.
While we do not have sufficient information to be certain, it seems possible
that the emission targets proposed by the EU will prove more onerous for Ireland
than for the UK so that the cost of electricity production with identical
technology and identical input costs could be higher in the Republic than in the
North. If quotas are non-tradable and if there is no regulation of cross-border
flows of electricity then the rise in the price of producing electricity in the
Republic of Ireland could result in a shift in production North of the border
under the UK’s (likely) more benevolent quota regime. This distortion would
obviously be wasteful as existing plant was closed in the Republic to be replaced
by new plant in Soutb Down or South Armagh. However, the waste involved
would be less than the alternative of allowing a big difference in electricity
prices to open up between Ireland and its neighbours. If the loop-hole on
electricity production moving North of the border is closed by EU regulations
then, in the absence of making quotas tradable, a higher cost of energy in the
Republic could see a movement of production and employment (including
migration) to other EU locations where the restrictions on emissions are likely to
be least onerous.
The effect of the EU proposals will be to create an uncertain environment for
those who are interested in investing in utilities, The dependence of the market
on regulation rather than oil market forces to determine profitability would prove
unattractive for new entrants. In addition, there is the problem that, in the
absence of a policy of using taxation to control emissions, intramarginal
producers could make huge profits while the marginal producer makes none. For
example, if the marginal production of electricity was to use biomass with
electricity prices being set equal to tile long-run marginal cost of production, all
those who are currently producing using other technologies will make very big
profits while new entrants would face a more difficult market. The right to
produce electricity from gas (for example) would, under such circumstances, be
a hugely profitable right. This problem could be overcome by charging a tax on
different fuels which reflected their damage to the environment. (This was the
underlying logic of the original proposal for a carbon tax.)
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The uncertainty about the future will pose a major obstacle to promoting
competition in the electricity generation industry as well as in other sectors of
tbe energy market. Unless a clear-cut and logical approach is adopted at an early
stage private firms will be encouraged to postpone investment, possibly
indefinitely, with a resulting reduction in competitive pressures.
Finally, a move to substantial restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions will
highlight other distortions in related markets. The policy of subsidising turf
production will be highlighted as being in direct conflict with the environmental
imperative. If turf production for energy use continues, the implicit subsidy
involved will rise dramatically. If other existing efficient plant has to be replaced
before its time to allow turf production to continue this will add to existing costs.
This applies both to existing turf stations and to any new ones built in the future.
7. 5 Strategy for the Future
It seems a pity that when global warming first became a major issue in the
EU in the early 1990s the Irish authorities did not strongly advocate the use of
fiscal instruments as the best method of achieving a substantial reduction in
emissions within the Union. This failure to advocate early action with
appropriate measures means that a rejection today of a wholly inappropriate
quota regime may be portrayed as environmental back-sliding rather than as a
desire to maximise the effectiveness of EU environmental policy.
The correct objective of Irish policy on global warming should be to ensure
that an appropriate mechanism is put in place which will ensure that any set of
enviromnental objectives will be met at minimum cost to the EU in terms of lost
output and employment. Because of the uncertainty concerning the
environmental imperative and because of the impossibility of predicting how EU
member economies will evolve over the long term, what is important is that the
mechanism for allocating the burden of adjustment is flexible and fair. While the
inclusion of emissions of methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture in the EU
emissions quotas leaves open the possibility that Ireland could actually find the
restrictions less severe than some other EU members there is no certainty that
this would be the case indefinitely.
The uncertainty involved in trying to pick a "winning formula" for choosing
quotas is illustrated by the probability that if the restriction was confined to
carbon dioxide alone then it seems likely that such an EU quota regime would
give rise to a greater than average cost for Ireland. As a result, it would be
dangerous to try and design a rigid mechanism which conferred a possible
temporary advantage on Ireland at the risk of a serious long-term cost. This
argues all the more forcefully for the adoption of a flexible regime which will
ensure that burdens are shared evenly across the EU with each polluter paying
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the same price per unit of pollution. This would also maximise output and
employment in the Union in the longer term, while abiding by the "polluter
pays" principle.
With this in mind Ireland should accept the need to restrict emissions within
the EU in the long term while advocating a strategy which would minimise the
economic cost to tile EU as a whole. The best mechanism for achieving this
reduction would be the carbon tax as originally advocated by the EU
Commission. If this is not a feasible objective for Irish policy in the EU then the
next best solution would be the adoption of tradable quotas. Ideally these should
be auctioned by the EU. If they are not, then the allocation of quotas will involve
income transfers between member states, just as the allocation of structural funds
involves such transfers. 28 The worst possible result from an Irish view point
(and from the view point of the European Union as a whole) would be the
adoption of a rigid quota regime which did not allow quotas to be bought and
sold within the EU. This could result in a significant reduction in the potential
growth rate of the Irish and other EU economies and some migration abroad of
economic activity. Even if the initial quota were to seem generous, it would be a
wholly inappropriate regime, given the impossibility of predicting with any
accuracy long-term trends in the Irish (or any other) economy.
The best solution would be to use a greenhouse gas tax applied to all
polluters (including farmers). The proceeds would be used to reduce other
distorting taxes, such as taxes on labour. The level of the tax would probably be
quite low if applied across the board. If an explicit tax were unacceptable then
quota rights to emit greenhouse gases should be auctioned off with the proceeds
of the auction being used to reduce taxes. A very much more costly solution
would be one where existing polluters were granted rights to continue polluting
without paying the market price for these rights (Parry, Williams and Goulder,
1997). While "moral suasion" or "voluntary agreements" seem attractive
initially, it seems unlikely that they will suffice to reduce emissions to the
required level. Of their nature they will only work if the cost of undertaking
them is very small. Given the likely magnitude of the cost of meeting the agreed
target, fiscal instruments are likely to prove essential.
Whatever regime is chosen at an EU level it is essential that the domestic
implementation uses fiscal instruments to change behaviour with all sectors and
consumers (polluters) being treated equally. Any attempt to insulate individual
sectors, such as agriculture, smelting, or turf-fired electricity generation, could
greatly increase the economic cost to Ireland of meeting its environmental
objectives.
za Another possibility would be to agree in advance for some compensating transfers
where the market value of emissions quotas differed ex post between countries.
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